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BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME:
A TOOL FOR BATTERERS?
MELANIE FRAGER GRIFFITH*
INTRODUCTION
On January 23, 1995, defense attorney Johnnie L. Cochran Jr. an-
nounced that several previously undisclosed witnesses would be testi-
fying for his client, Orenthal James Simpson-a man who once plead
no contest to battering his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson,' and who
was acquitted of murdering both her and Ronald Lyle Goldman3
When defense attorneys disclosed that they would call Dr. Lenore E.
Walker as an expert on behalf of OJ. Simpson, both the prosecution
and advocates for battered women3 across the nation were shocked.
As media correspondents focused on the legal implications of
Cochran's eve-of-trial announcement that he was adding names to the
* Many thanks to my husband, Jason D. Griffith, for his support while I was
writing this Note and throughout law schooL I would also like to thank Thane Rosen-
baum for helping me develop my topic and Ruth Jones for her insightful comments on
prior drafts of this Note.
1. See David Margolick, Prosecution Quickly Tries to Tarnish Simpson's Image,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1995, at A14 (detailing the responding officers' testimony about
the incidents that led to the 1989 charges against O.J. Simpson for abusing his wife);
see also People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 36094, at *19-34 (Cal. Super. CL
Jan. 31, 1995) (official transcript of examination of John Edwards).
2. See People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL - (Cal. Super. Ct Oct. 3,
1995) (official transcript of not guilty verdict).
3. The term "battered woman" as used in this Note refers to any woman who has
been abused by her spouse or lover more than once and remains in the relationship.
See Julie Blackman, Intimate Violence 191 (1989). The above definition includes a
woman who is not married to or living with the batterer. kd; see infra note 135 (defin-
ing a "battered woman"); see also infra part II.B.1 (outlining the components of the
battered woman syndrome).
While it is true that battering also occurs in same-sex relationships and situations
where the woman is the aggressor, the majority of battering incidents considered by
the criminal justice system occurs where the aggressor is a man and the victim is a
woman. See generally No More! Stopping Domestic Violence, Ms., Sept.Oct. 1994, at
1-65 (addressing the issue of domestic violence from a feminist perspective and setting
forth statistics about the pervasiveness of the problem). Non-traditional types of do-
mestic violence are beyond the scope of this Note. The use of masculine pronouns in
the context of a batterer and feminine pronouns in the context of a victim, however, is
not intended to minimize such incidents of abuse. For a discussion on the specific
dynamics of battered men, see Julia J. Chavez, Battered Men and the California Law,
22 Sw. U. L. Rev. 239 (1992).
Battered women who are not married to the batterer, as any individual, can seek an
order of protection from a state's criminal court. Many states also allow some women
to petition for a civil protective order even if they are not married to or currently
living with the batterer. See eg., N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 812(1)(a)-(d), (5) (McKinney
1995) (outlining who can pursue an order of protection in family court). For a survey
of states that have enacted statutes authorizing civil orders of protection for domestic
abuse and the distinctions among those statutes, see generally Peter Finn, Statutory
Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection Orders Against Domestic
Abuse, Fain. L.Q., Spring 1989, at 43.
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defense's witness list,4 many members of the battered women's move-
ment felt betrayed by Dr. Walker's decision to testify on O.J. Simp-
son's behalf.5
Dr. Walker has been a voice for battered women for more than
twenty years.6 In 1979, Dr. Walker developed the much cited, but per-
haps little understood, "battered woman syndrome"-a theoretical
explanation of the psychological impact of prolonged spousal abuse.'
She has authored ten books on the subject of domestic violence.8
4. By constitutional mandate, the discovery process in criminal cases must be
reciprocal in nature. According to Article I, § 30(c) of the Constitution of the State of
California, "In order to provide for fair and speedy trials, discovery in criminal cases
shall be reciprocal in nature, as prescribed by the Legislature or by the people
through the initiative process."
The California legislature enacted reciprocal discovery statutes binding on the pros-
ecuting attorney and the defense counsel in a criminal trial. See Cal. Penal Code
§ 1054.1, .3 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995) (setting forth what evidence shall be subject to
reciprocal discovery); see also Izazaga v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 304, 316-17 (Cal.
1991) (ruling that a defendant's disclosure of witnesses pursuant to reciprocal discov-
ery provisions of the Penal Code triggers the defendant's right to discover the prose-
cution's rebuttal witnesses).
Judge Lance Ito had scheduled opening arguments to begin on January 24, 1995.
Thus, it was startling to learn on January 23, 1995 that crucial expert and alibi wit-
nesses had been added to the defense team's list of witnesses.
5. See Debra J. Saunders, Sleeping With the Enemy, S.F. Chron., Feb. 3, 1995, at
A23 ("Some feminists are furious at battered-woman-syndrome maven Lenore
Walker's decision to testify on OJ. Simpson's behalf. They feel it is a betrayal of
Walker's lifework to take the stand on behalf of a batterer."); see also Sheryl McCar-
thy, O.J. on Trial: One More Sellout in the O.J. Case?, N.Y. Newsday, Jan. 27, 1995, at
A4 (reporting that some advocates for battered women attribute Dr. Walker's deci-
sion to testify for O.J. to the fact that she is "a greedy publicity seeker and promoter
of false information . . . [who] has exploited battered women to advance her own
career").
6. Dr. Walker is one of the most recognized advocates for battered women,
working on various fronts to combat domestic violence:
For 20 years, Lenore Walker has devoted herself to battered women, testi-
fying as an expert witness in courtrooms across America. Her groundbreak-
ing forays into the psyches of abused wives have helped shape laws, public
opinion and, time and time again, individual fates.
In feminist forums, at psychological seminars and in the shelters where
battered wives hid, Walker was a heroine.
Tamara Jones, The Witness's Startling Stand Champion of Battered Women to Testify
in 0.J. Simpson's Defense, Wash. Post, Feb. 4, 1995, at D1.
7. See generally Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman 42-70 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter The Battered Woman] (outlining the battered woman syndrome and the theory of
"learned helplessness" as it relates to victims of domestic violence).
Many commentators, including Ann Jones, an author and advocate for battered
women, have criticized the increased use of Dr. Walker's battered woman syndrome
in the legal arena. See Ann Jones, 'Battered-Woman' Defense, USA Today, Feb. 14,
1995, at 15A.
8. McCarthy, supra note 5, at A4. For a sample of Dr. Walker's work, see The
Battered Woman, supra note 7; Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome
(1984) [hereinafter The Battered Woman Syndrome]; Lenore E. Walker, Terrifying
Love: Why Battered Women Kill and How Society Responds (1989) [hereinafter Ter-
rifying Love]. Dr. Walker has also written numerous law review and other scholarly
articles on the subject of battered women and domestic violence in general. See, e.g.,
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Newspaper reports have referred to Dr. Walker as the "patron saint of
battered women,"9 a "hero" to advocates for victims of domestic vio-
lence,"0 an "honored pioneer,"'" a "trail-blazing researcher in the
study of battered women," 2 and "the mother of the battered women's
syndrome."'1 3 Dr. Walker chairs an American Psychological Associa-
tion task force on family violence.' Perhaps most important for the
development of the battered woman syndrome as a legal concept, Dr.
Walker has testified at more than 350 trials as an expert on the bat-
tered woman syndrome, usually on behalf of women accused of killing
their abusive husbands.'
The battered woman syndrome describes a cycle of brutality where
violent episodes gradually increase, eventually culminating with an ex-
plosive and vicious encounter. After a period of contrition, the cycle
repeats itself as the violence and abuse continuously worsen.' 6 Addi-
tionally, according to the battered woman syndrome, the victim be-
comes helpless in the face of unpredictable abuse-she is unable to
escape from the batterer's control, often acting in ways that society
regards as abnormal, even masochistic. 17
Since its inception in the late 1970s, the battered woman syndrome
has benefited victims of domestic violence-most prominently, those
women who are on trial for killing their batterers and who plead self-
defense.' 8 By explaining a woman's behavior according to patterns
Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 Notre Dame J.L.
Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 321 (1992) [hereinafter Walker, Syndrome and Self-Defense].
9. Jones, supra note 6, at D1.
10. Sue Reilly, Valley Chronicle Nothing Funny About Effects of Simpson Trial,
L.A. Tunes, Feb. 6, 1995, at B5 (Valley Edition) (reporting that Betty Fisher, execu-
tive director of Haven Hills, a nonprofit agency that serves victims of family violence,
viewed Dr. Walker as "a hero of hers"). Reilly explains that until the announcement
that Dr. Walker was going to testify for OJ. Simpson, "every client of Haven Hills
ha[d] been given Walker's book, 'The Battered Woman.' It ha[d] been the agency's
textbook. Now, that will probably change." Id. According to the director of the pro-
gram, "We will try to find another text for our clients .... I feel Lenore Walker has
violated our trust." Id.
11. Bettina Boxall, Abuse Expert Stirs Uproar With Simpson Defense Role L.A.
Times, Jan. 29, 1995, at Al.
12. Id.
13. Jones, supra note 6, at D1 (quoting defense attorney Johnnie Cochran Jr.'s
statements to the jurors about Dr. Walker); see also People v. Simpson, No.
BA097211, 1995 WL 27396, at *20 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 1995) (official transcript of
opening statement by Mr. Cochran) (referring to Dr. Walker as the "No. 1 expert in
America, perhaps in the world").
14. Lenore E. Walker, remarks made by press release distributed by Israel E. Le-
vine, Chief Operating Officer of Richard Cohen Associates, Public Relations Counsel
1 (Jan. 27, 1995) [hereinafter Press Release] (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
15. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at A4-A5.
16. See infra part II (describing Dr. Walker's theory entitled battered woman
syndrome).
17. See infra part II.B.l.b (describing the "learned helplessness" component of the
battered woman syndrome).
18. See infra part Il.A.
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observed in battered women generally, expert testimony on the bat-
tered woman syndrome gives context to a woman's decision to resort
to violence. 9 A woman asserting a self-defense claim has the burden
of proving that she acted "reasonably" in light of her perception of
imminent and life-threatening danger."0 The battered woman syn-
drome provides a psychological explanation of prolonged spousal
abuse, and therefore is relevant in a trial where the woman's state of
mind is at issue."'
Battered woman syndrome evidence has been relied upon in other
contexts as well.2 2 The week before Cochran's announcement, prose-
cutor Marcia Clark had relied on Dr. Walker's theory in an effort to
gain admission of evidence 3 of particular acts of prior abuse of Nicole
Brown Simpson by O.J. Simpson. 4 In fact, the prosecution's theory
19. Id. The claim of self-defense translates into an argument that the defendant
was justified in using force against the victim. As illustrated by New York's Penal
Law, "A person may ... use physical force upon another person when and to the
extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or a third person
from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical
force by such other person .... " N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(1) (McKinney 1987 & Supp.
1995). The statute goes on to state that a person may not use deadly force unless
"[hie reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physi-
cal force," and he is unable to retreat with complete safety. Id. § 35.15(2)(a).
When a battered woman is on trial for the murder of her husband, evidence on the
battered woman syndrome can help the trier of fact understand why the woman's
perception of imminent danger was reasonable, thereby justifying her use of deadly
force.
20. See generally Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and
Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 382 (1991) (ar-
guing that proposals for "radical redefinition of various elements of self-defense juris-
prudence" will not meet the need to change the "courtroom climate in which battered
women's homicide cases are tried").
21. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375-77 (N.J. 1984) (determining that
evidence on the battered woman syndrome is relevant to the reasonableness of the
defendant battered woman's belief, to her state of mind, and to bolster her plea of
self-defense).
22. See discussion infra part III.
23. For a brief discussion of the circumstances under which evidence of a party's
or a witness' character can be introduced at trial, see infra note 205.
24. After a pre-trial hearing during which the prosecution argued that evidence of
prior abuse of Nicole Brown Simpson by O.J. Simpson should be admissible, Judge
Lance Ito ruled that certain incidents of "[O.J. Simpson's] prior assaults upon Nicole
Brown Simpson may be admitted at trial as to the issues of motive, intent, plan and
identity." See People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 21768, at *1-2 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (Ruling on Defendant's In Limine Motion To Exclude Evidence of
Domestic Discord) (deciding that "evidence of defendant's prior assaults upon Nicole
Brown Simpson may be admitted at trial as to the issues of motive, intent, plan and
identity"). As Judge Ito explained:
In broad brush, the prosecution seeks to admit this evidence to establish a
pattern of conduct which they characterize as a classic example of Battered
Wife Syndrome... indicating an escalating course of conduct indicative of
the motive, planning, intent and identity of the assailant in the homicide of
Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman.
Id at *1.
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
of the motive behind the killing of Nicole Brown Simpson was that
OJ. Simpson was a batterer who tormented, brutalized, and eventu-
ally murdered his ex-wife.25 It was the defense, however, that sought
to admit expert testimony specifically on the battered woman syn-
drome.2 Although Dr. Walker was ultimately removed from the de-
fense's witness list,27 her association with OJ. Simpson's defense
25. The presentation of the prosecution's case began with evidence of prolonged
and repeated incidents of abuse and battering. Nicole Brown Simpson's sister, Denise
Brown, testified to witnessing OJ. Simpson beat and threaten Nicole Brown Simpson.
Ronald Shipp, a friend of the Simpsons, testified to Nicole Brown Simpson's request
for help in light of her husband's abuse, as well as to OJ. Simpson's admission on the
day following Nicole Brown Simpson's murder that he had dreamed about killing his
ex-wife. Other evidence presented at the opening of the prosecution's case included
an audio tape of Nicole Brown Simpson's frantic call to 911 emergency, police photo-
graphs of a bruised Nicole Brown Simpson, and police reports from when officers had
been summoned by her to the Simpson estate. See generally People v. Simpson, No.
BA097211, 1995 WL 36094, at *19-34 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 1995) (official transcript
of examination of Sharyn Gilbert and John Edwards); People v. Simpson, No.
BA097211, 1995 WL 36096, at *2-35 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 1995) (official transcript
of examination of John Edwards and Mike Farrell); People v. Simpson. No.
BA097211, 1995 WL 37667, at *20-35 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 1995) (official transcript
of examination of Ronald Shipp); People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 42097,
at *4-29 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 1995) (official transcript of examination of Robert
Lemer, Catherine Boe, and Carl Colby); People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL
44173, at *3-33 (Cal. Super. CL Feb. 6, 1995) (official transcript of examination of
Denise Brown).
26. See People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 27396, at *20 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Jan. 25, 1995) (official transcript of opening statement by Mr. Cochran) (discussing
Dr. Walker and her forthcoming testimony).
27. To date, it is unclear precisely why Dr. Walker was dropped as a witness for
Simpson. What is clear, however, is that the prosecution omitted a significant portion
of its case depicting Nicole Brown Simpson as a battered woman, perhaps suffering
from battered woman syndrome. The court had ruled admissible various incidents of
abuse and explained that according to California precedent,
Where a defendant is charged with a violent crime and has or had a previous
relationship with a victim, prior assaults upon the same victim, when offered
on disputed issues, e.g. identity, intent, motive, etcetera, are admissible
based solely upon the consideration of identical perpetrator and victim with-
out resort to a 'distinctive modus operandi' analysis of other factors.
People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 21768, at *2 (Cal. Super. CL Jan. 18,
1995) (Ruling on Defendant's In Limine Motion To Exclude Evidence of Domestic
Discord) (quoting People v. Zack, 184 Cal. App. 3d 409 (1986)).
With minimal evidence of battered woman syndrome introduced at trial however,
the defense had little to rebut with Dr. Walker's testimony. Perhaps, the defense was
concerned that Dr. Walker's inconsistent writings regarding men who batter would
become a hotly contested debate that was not worth waging. See infra part IV.A.
Finally, it is possible that Dr. Walker herself felt the pressure and displeasure of other
members of the battered women's movement regarding her participation in the trial.
Regardless of the reason not to use Dr. Walker in the Simpson trial, for purposes of
this Note, two things remain clear. first, Dr. Walker initially agreed to testify on be-
half of an admitted batterer in his murder trial, and, second, other defendant-batter-
ers may try to rely on her actual testimony, or at least her theory, to bolster their
claims of innocence. As such, it is still relevant to examine how courts can guard
against the improper use of the battered woman syndrome as a tool for batterers.
1995)
146 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
raises the question of whether battered woman syndrome can or
should be used by criminal defendant-batterers.28
The possibility that an expert on the battered woman syndrome
could testify for a defendant-batterer raises the specter of confusion
surrounding the way practitioners may properly utilize or challenge
the use of the battered woman syndrome in the courtroom. Dr.
Walker stated that her reasons for agreeing to join O.J. Simpson's de-
fense team stemmed from her desire to prevent her theory from being
misrepresented. 9 In a press release distributed by her public relations
firm, Dr. Walker asserted that her participation in the O.J. Simpson
trial would "consist of helping the defense understand the patterns of
domestic violence reported in the Simpson family and of offering psy-
chological research in an objective manner to evaluate such pat-
28. For purposes of this Note, the term "defendant-batterer" will include alleged
batterers.
Critics of Dr. Walker emphasize that because Dr. Walker is known for her pioneer-
ing work as an advocate for battered women, when she testifies as an expert for a
batterer, jurors are likely to be significantly influenced.
Recently, Dr. Walker testified as an expert for George Samuel Wade, at his Fort
Lauderdale trial for the murder of his ex-lover, Suzanne Emerick. After the jurors
declined to convict the defendant of first degree murder, Wade's attorney was quoted
as saying of Lenore Walker: "There's no question the jury loved her, because I spoke
to the jurors after the trial .... She was a star in every respect." Ronnie Greene,
From Broward Trial to the O.J. Spotlight Abuse Expert Saved Wife Killer's Life, Miami
Herald, Feb. 2, 1995, at 1A, 5A; see also infra part III.D (discussing the impact of Dr.
Walker's participation in that trial as an expert for the defendant-batterer).
29. Dr. Walker's critics are not convinced that her motives for agreeing to testify
as an expert on behalf of O.J. Simpson are purely objective. Some believe that by
agreeing to testify for a defendant-batterer she is nothing more than a "domestic vio-
lence profiteer." Greene, supra note 28, at 5A. "She's playing both sides .... This
woman was betraying not only my daughter, but all the women in this country who
consider her an authority on this complex issue." Id. (quoting the mother of a murder
victim describing her view of Lenore Walker, who appeared as an expert for the man
accused of murdering her daughter). Others accuse her of "sleeping with the enemy."
Saunders, supra note 5, at A23. Still others question her expertise, citing that the bulk
of her research has focused on battered women, not men who batter. See discussion
infra part IV.A.2. Critics, including Molly Chaudhuri, a former prosecutor with the
Norfolk district attorney's office in Massachusetts, note that Lenore Walker is "not an
authority on men who batter [and] is thus not qualified to testify about O.J. Simpson."
See Alison Bass, Women's Advocate Takes Heat for Role in Trial: Sees Defense Testi-
mony as 'Teaching Moment', Boston Globe, Feb. 4, 1995, § 3, at 8. These critics chal-
lenge her ability to assess adequately the likelihood of OJ. Simpson's innocence or
guilt. See id. As one scholar noted:
"It's only slight hyperbole to say that OJ. may be the first actual batterer
she has interviewed," said Richard J. Gelles, director of the family violence
research program at the University of Rhode Island. "If she develops a psy-
chological profile of OJ., to what is she going to compare it? She, of all the
domestic violence experts in the country, is the least experienced in analyz-
ing data from men who batter."
Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 138 (discussing Dr. Walker's research in the
development of the battered woman syndrome).
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terns. ' 30 Dr. Walker emphasized that, as a professional, she testifies
about the same underlying facts of domestic violence whether asked
to do so by the prosecution or the defense.3 1 Furthermore, she be-
lieves that information about the syndrome is objective evidence
which can appropriately be used by either party in a criminal trial.'
The above view, however, ignores the dynamics of a criminal trial.
Even if Dr. Walker testifies about the same facts associated with do-
mestic violence, regardless of who pays her fee, some believe her
words have a heightened impact when she testifies on behalf of a bat-
terer.33 As a former prosecutor explained, "Here you have the fore-
most feminist academic advocate for battered women sitting on the
stand for O.J. As a juror, if I wasn't listening to anything she said, I
would be struck by the fact that she came and spoke on his behalf."31
As a prerequisite to the admissibility of expert testimony of any
kind, the proponent of such evidence must meet certain standards.
According to state and federal rules of evidence, expert testimony is
admissible only if it will be helpful35 to the jury and does not include
ultimate conclusions about the dispositive issue relating to the mental
state of a criminal defendant.36 The defense in the Simpson case,
however, was not planning to rely on Dr. Walker's testimony simply to
30. Press Release, supra note 14, at 1. In the press release distributed on behalf of
Dr. Walker and her colleague, Dr. Geraldine Butts Stahly, Dr. Walker explained the
basis for her forthcoming testimony:
As we began to examine the evidence over the past five months, which
included some 40 hours of evaluation of OJ. Simpson himself, we realized
that the potential for long-term harm to battered women was present if the
facts, patterns and significance of the battering in this case were misinter-
preted, distorted or otherwise misused by either side.
Id. at 2.
31. Id. at 1.
32. Id.
33. See Bass, supra note 29, § 3, at 8.
34. Id. § 3, at 8 (quoting a former district attorney about the impact of Dr.
Walker's testimony on behalf of a batterer).
35. The Federal Rules of Evidence have such a requirement: "If scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise." Fed. R. Evid. 702.
California's Evidence Code uses similar language in outlining the purpose of admit-
ting expert testimony: "If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form
of an opinion is limited to such opinion as is: (a) Related to a subject that is suffi-
ciently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier
of fact.. . ." Cal. Evid. Code § 801 (West 1966 & Supp. 1995).
36. The Federal Rules of Evidence explain the limits of opinion testimony by an
expert as follows:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether
the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting
an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate is-
sues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).
1995]
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educate the jury about the psychological impact of prolonged spousal
abuse according to the battered woman syndrome.37 Rather, Dr.
Walker was going to testify that "it cannot be predicted that a particu-
lar batterer will turn out to be a killer unless there is evidence of prior
escalating life-threatening behavior. ' 38 According to Dr. Walker,
such behavior was not evident in the Simpsons' relationship.39 Such
testimony suggests that O.J. Simpson, and the patterns of violence in
his relationship with Nicole Brown Simpson, were not typical of abu-
sive relationships resulting in homicide.4" The logic to such a conclu-
sion is arguably misleading. This Note asserts that it is improper to
extrapolate information regarding the actions of a defendant-batterer
from evidence relating to the psyche of a victim.4
The precise ramifications that Dr. Walker's decision to testify for an
accused batterer will have on the legal community's use of the bat-
tered woman syndrome in criminal trials remains unclear.42 What is
37. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing the limited purpose
for admitting expert testimony).
38. Press Release, supra note 14, at 2 (quoting Dr. Walker); see also Alan Dersho-
witz, Why Spousal Abuse Doesn't Predict Murder, The Fordham Advocate, Feb. 1,
1995, at 6 ("Because so few 'batterers' end up killing, all reputable social scientists
agree that spousal murder cannot be predicted from a history of spousal abuse.");
'This Case is About a Rush to Judgment... Win at Any Cost,' Wash. Post, Jan. 26,
1995, at A14 [hereinafter Rush to Judgment] (transcribing portions of Cochran's open-
ing statement).
As discussed in this Note, the argument advanced by O.J. Simpson's defense attor-
neys is an improper and misleading use of the battered woman syndrome. See infra
part II (describing the battered woman syndrome) and part IV.A (discussing why it is
improper to extrapolate information about the actions of a defendant-batterer from a
theory relating to the state of mind of a battered woman).
An example of the potential misuse of the theory is evidenced by the Simpson case.
Rather than manifesting the "helplessness" associated with the battered woman syn-
drome, Nicole Brown Simpson has been portrayed as a vibrant and independent wo-
man who had, to a certain extent, escaped from O.J. Simpson's rigid control: she had
divorced him, was living apart from him, and was building a life for herself and her
children. O.J. Simpson's defense attorneys could attempt to portray their client's re-
lationship with his ex-wife as wholly distinct from any patterns detailed in the bat-
tered woman syndrome, thus, attempting to minimize a claim that because he abused
her in the past, he likely murdered her. See People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995
WL 27396, at *22 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 1995) (official transcript of opening state-
ment by Mr. Cochran) (transcribing Johnnie Cochran's opening statement and his
remarks about the alleged domestic violence including that, "according to the lady
who is the mother of this particular area, and although domestic violence is a very,
very serious problem in this country, the level of violence in this case, the pattern is
atypical").
39. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at A4, A22.
40. According to the defense, the relationship between O.J. Simpson and Nicole
Brown Simpson can arguably be distinguished from the typical patterns of battering
relationships for a number of reasons. See People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995
WL 27396, at *52-53 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 1995) (official transcript of opening
statement by Mr. Cochran).
41. See infra part IV.
42. Regardless of her motives, Dr. Walker's decision to testify on behalf of an
admitted batterer will not pass unnoticed. Rather, her willingness to participate in a
[Vol. 64
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apparent, however, is that when a batterer is on trial for the abuse or
murder of his wife, courts must be prepared to respond to the defend-
ant-batterer's attempt to rely on the battered woman syndrome. As
discussed in this Note, reliance on expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome to explain the behavior of a defendant-batterer is
irrelevant and misleading. This Note examines how the battered wo-
man syndrome has, in some instances, become a tool for the batterer.
This Note also explores ways for victims of domestic violence, in con-
junction with prosecutors and the courts, to guard against a defend-
ant-batterer's improper reliance on the battered woman syndrome in
a criminal trial.'
Part I describes the long history of violence against women. Part II
outlines the battered woman syndrome-a theoretical explanation of
the psychological impact of prolonged spousal abuse. Part I reviews
the various ways in which victims of domestic abuse have used the
battered woman syndrome: as a mechanism to support a claim of self-
defense; as an argument in favor of clemency and probation; and as a
justification for custody of their children. While acknowledging that
the battered woman syndrome may bolster a battered woman's case,
part III examines ways in which the battered woman syndrome also
has been used to hinder the legal claims of battered women. Part IV
urges courts to guard against a batterer's manipulation of the battered
woman syndrome to maintain his claim of innocence. Courts must
shift the focus of a trial away from the victim's mental state and how it
comports with the battered woman syndrome. As such, they can bet-
ter avoid the illogical conclusion that the defendant must not be guilty
if the pattern of abuse in a given relationship does not fall squarely
within the bounds of the battered woman syndrome." This Note con-
cludes that to avoid the distorted reliance by a defendant-batterer on
a theory designed to explain the actions of a battered woman, courts
trial that is receiving unprecedented media attention will undoubtedly impact the
manner in which the battered woman syndrome is both viewed and relied upon in the
future. See, eg., supra note 10 (discussing a battered woman's support agency's deci-
sion to replace Dr. Walker's book as a text for its clients).
43. See infra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing the procedure for admit-
ting expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome and how such evidence does
not violate the limited admissibility rules for character evidence).
44. See Jones, supra note 7, at 15A (arguing that courts "twist [the battered wo-
man syndrome] and recruit it to the other side"). Ann Jones, a noted expert on bat-
tered women and critic of the overuse of the battered woman syndrome in court,
asserts:
Given the convoluted career of battered-woman syndrome, you can easily
imagine the arguments: Nicole Simpson doesn't pass the battered-woman-
syndrome test. By that standard (the only standard courts accept), she
wasn't a real battered woman. Setting aside for the sake of scientific theory
her real bruises and her real calls to the police, if she wasn't a real battered
woman, then O. must not be a real batterer-and certainly not one who
would kill.
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must limit the admissibility of expert testimony on the battered wo-
man syndrome in the prosecution of a batterer.
I. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Throughout history, society has tolerated-even legally sanc-
tioned-abuse against women.45 For centuries, social structures have
endorsed male domination within and outside the family unit.46 A
review of American legal history uncovers a time when married wo-
men, as compared to men, were practically paralyzed under the law.
Society's perception of women as subordinate to men has hindered
victims of domestic abuse in their struggle for legal recourse. 48 Un-
derstanding the historical sanction of violence against women pro-
vides context to the ongoing struggle to eradicate the continued abuse
of women.49
A. Legal and Social Reinforcement of Violence Against Women
A review of western civilization uncovers numerous laws authoriz-
ing the use of physical force to discipline and censure women. 0 The
Romans had the most extensive legal restrictions on the rights of wo-
men. For example, the first marriage law in Roman times required
wives to "conform themselves entirely to the temper of their hus-
45. See discussion infra part II.A.
46. See Susan Schechter, Toward an Analysis of the Persistence of Violence Against
Women in the Home, Aegis, July/Aug., 1979, at 47 (describing domination as a social
structure in which certain groups of people can determine and limit the spheres of
activity of other groups by threatening or using force in order to coerce compliance).
47. See, e.g., Sarah Grimk6, Legal Disabilities of Women: Letters on the Equality
of the Sexes and the Condition of Women 74-83 (1837), reprinted in Freedom, Femi-
nism, and the State 121-27 (Wendy McElroy ed., 1982). "[A] wife dares not do what
will be disagreeable to one who is, in his own estimation, her superior, and who makes
her feel, in the privacy of domestic life, that she has thwarted him." Id. at 123.
48. See Susan Schechter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles
of the Battered Women's Movement 216 (1982) ("The patriarchal family predates
capitalist society, and so does violence against women within it."); see also Marvin
Harris, Why Men Dominate Women, N.Y. Times (Magazine), Nov. 13, 1977, at 46
(tracing men's domination of women back to band and village societies and rejecting
the view that such domination occurred because it is natural for men to be aggressive
and take control).
49. See Kathleen Hofeller, Ph.D., Battered Women, Shattered Lives 49-66 (1983)
(discussing the historical precedents for wife beating). "Cultural conceptions of femi-
ninity not only influence the relative overall social status of women, but also effec-
tively control behavior through the process of socialization; women who are brought
up to believe that they are weak, incompetent, and helpless are less likely to challenge
existing restrictions." Id at 49.
50. For a comprehensive examination of how religions have historically condoned
wife beating and the effect of that condonation on the law, see Kathleen A. McDon-
ald, Battered Wives, Religion & Law: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 2 Yale J.L. &
Feminism 251 (1990); see also Rhonda L. Kohler, Comment, The Battered Woman and
Tort Law: A New Approach to Fighting Domestic Violence, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1025,
1031-33 (1992) (describing how wife beating has been condoned throughout history).
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bands."'" Husbands, in turn, could rule their wives as "necessary and
inseparable possessions.""2 The reach of a Roman husband's control
extended beyond the boundaries of daily life: "A Roman wife re-
mained under the guardianship of her husband, who possessed patria
potestas5 3 including the power to sell his wife and children into slav-
ery or put them to death."' Furthermore, Roman law specifically au-
thorized a husband to use violence to sVunish his wife, including
breaking her nose or blackening her eye.
Both legal and moral codes of pre-capitalist and early capitalist so-
cieties in Western Europe facilitated violence against women. Ac-
cording to English common law, a wife "came under the control of her
husband [who] had the legal right to use force against her in order to
insure that she fulfilled her wifely obligations, which included consum-
mation of the marriage, cohabitation, maintenance of conjugal rights,
sexual fidelity, and general obedience and respect for his wishes.15 6
An 1878 publication entitled Wife Torture in England documented
51. McDonald, supra note 50, at 254 (quoting R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P.
Dobash, Wives: The 'Appropriate' Victims of Marital Violence, 2 Victimology 426,427
(1977-78)).
52. Id.
53. Patria potestas, as used in Roman law, is defined as "paternal authority" or
"paternal power."
This term denotes the aggregate of those peculiar powers and rights which,
by the civil law of Rome, belonged to the head of a family in respect to his
wife, children (natural or adopted), and any more remote descendants who
sprang from him through males only. Anciently, it was of very extensive
reach, embracing even the power of life and death, but was gradually cur-
tailed ....
Black's Law Dictionary 1127 (6th ed. 1990).
54. Elizabeth Pleck, Domestic Tyranny- The Making of Social Policy Against
Family Violence from Colonial Times to the Present 9 (1987) (footnote omitted).
55. See idU Other societies had similar laws both authorizing violence against wo-
men and classifying women as mere chattel A sixteenth century Russian code cau-
tioned husbands not to strike their wives on the face or head, for fear that the
husbands might be disadvantaged should the wives become deaf or blind. Mildred D.
Pagelow, Family Violence 282 (1984). Additionally, in many regions of Europe, a
man could kill his wife without penalty well into the 1600s. Robert T. Sigler, Domestic
Violence in Context 9 (1989). On the other hand, a woman who killed her husband
was punished as though she were guilty of treason, because her homicidal act was
considered analogous to killing the king. William Blackstone, Commentaries, book
IV, ch. 6, at 613 (West 1897) (noting that a wife's killing of her husband had formerly
been denominated a petit treason).
56. R. Emerson Dobash and Russell Dobash, Violence Against Wives: A Case
Against the Patriarchy 60 (1979) [hereinafter Dobash and Dobash] (footnote
omitted).
In tracing the historical context within which wife battering has developed, Susan
Schechter describes the result of a woman's legal and social status of "wife." "Her
status as wife excluded her from the legal process, placed her in the same category as
children and servants, required obedience, and gave her husband extraordinary dis-
cretion over determining punishable offenses." Schechter, supra note 48, at 217 (foot-
note omitted).
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6000 of the most "brutal assaults" on women in England, and hypoth-
esized as to why such abhorrent abuse continued:
The general depreciation of women as a sex is bad enough, but in
the matter we are considering, the special depreciation of wives is
more directly responsible for the outrages they endure. The notion
that a man's wife is his property in the sense in which a horse is his
property .... is the fatal root of incalculable evil and misery.57
English rape laws perceived rape as a crime against the husband, fa-
ther, or fianc6 of the victim.5" As such, rape cases were settled prop-
erly if the male "possessor" of the female victim was compensated
adequately for the damage to his personal belonging.59 Marital rape
was inconceivable under the law because a woman could not legally
refuse her husband's conjugal rights.60
Coupled with the legal sanction of male domination were powerful
moral codes that "provided ideological justification for patriarchal
marriages .... Marriage laws explicitly recognized the family as the
domain of the husband, forced women to conform to the man's will,
and punished men and women unequally for infractions of marriage
vows."'6 1 While ecclesiastical church courts in England could grant a
woman a separation or divorce on the ground of cruelty-defined as
"life-threatening acts of violence"-they rarely did.62 Despite the fact
that a husband's absolute power of chastisement was abolished in
1829, it was not until the passage of the Married Women's Property
Acts63 at the end of the 19th century that conviction for assault be-
57. Francis Power Cobbe, Wife Torture in England, quoted in Dobash and Dobash,
supra note 56, at 73.
58. Sigler, supra note 55, at 8.
59. Id.
60. Only in the last 15 years have all 50 states made it a crime for a man to rape his
wife. Oklahoma and North Carolina only recently acknowledged marital rape as a
crime. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.8 (1993) (amending in 1993 a law that pro-
vided a defense to rape if the victim was the spouse of the person committing the act);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995) (amending in 1983 a law that
defined rape as "an act of sexual intercourse... accomplished with a male or female,
not the spouse of the perpetrator" under certain circumstances including, inter alia,
where the victim is under age sixteen, where the victim is incapable of consent by
reason of mental illness or intoxication, and where force is used or threatened).
61. Schechter, supra note 48, at 217 (footnote omitted). R. Emerson Dobash and
Russell Dobash outline the legal ramifications for a woman who decided to get
married:
To be a wife meant becoming the property of a husband, taking a secondary
position in a marital hierarchy of power and worth, being legally and morally
bound to obey the will and wishes of one's husband, and thus, quite logically,
subject to his control even to the point of physical chastisement or murder.
Dobash and Dobash, supra note 56, at 33.
62. Pleck, supra note 54, at 230 n.12.
63. For a discussion on the Married Women's Property Acts, see Stephen B.
Presser & Jamil S. Zainaldin, Law and Jurisprudence in American History 523-30 (2d
ed. 1989) (citing Maxwell Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society 92-
99, 104-08, 112-22 (Harvard Univ. Press 1976)). Bloomfield states, "Married women
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came a ground for divorce.' 4 Such grounds were rarely relied on,
however, because of the difficulty of proving each element of di-
vorce.' According to historians, "[a] divorce on the ground of cruelty
was likely only if the husband's misconduct was persistent and suffi-
ciently serious to 'break down her health or render serious malady
imminent.'"" It was not until the last decade of the 19th century that
"the legal right of the English husband to restrain his wife's liberty by
physical means may be said to have been completely abolished."6'
B. The History of Violence Against Women in America
As with other areas of law, English common law pertaining to mar-
riage notably influenced early American law. Following English com-
mon law, men could use physical force to discipline their wives under
the "rule of thumb." 6 According to the rule, a husband could beat his
wife as long as his stick was "no thicker than his thumb."69 Ironically,
the rule of thumb was intended to protect women from "over-zealous
husbands."70 Although the rule was not specifically sanctioned in stat-
utory form, the Mississippi Supreme Court in 1824 upheld a husband's
secured a greater measure of economic (and ultimately social) independence with the
passage of the Married Women's Property Acts in a majority of states."
64. See Dobash and Dobash, supra note 56, at 63.
65. See Schechter, supra note 48, at 217-18; see also Dobash and Dobash, supra
note 56, at 63 ("It was... very difficult to get a conviction for assault and the standard
of proof was often so high as to make a conviction almost impossible.").
66. Dobash and Dobash, supra note 56, at 63 (citation omitted).
67. Id. (discussing Reg. v. Jackson, an 1891 case) (citation omitted).
68. Terry Davidson, Wife Beating: A Recurring Phenomenon Throughout History,
in Battered Women: A Psychological Study of Domestic Violence 18 (Maria Roy ed.,
1977), cited in U.S. Comn'n on Civil Rights, Under the Rule of Thumb 2 (1982)
[hereinafter Rule of Thumb].
69. The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 12; see also Rule of Thumb, supra note
68, at 1 (describing the fact that church men were encouraged to beat their wives).
According to 15th century Rules of Marriage:
When you see your wife commit an offense, don't rush at her with insults
and violent blows .... Scold her sharply, bully and terrify her. And if this
still doesn't work... take up a stick and beat her soundly, for it is better to
punish the body and correct the soul than to damage the soul and spare the
body.... Then readily beat her, not in rage but out of charity and concern
for her soul, so that the beating will redound to your merit and her good.
Id at 1 (quoting Terry Davidson, Conjugal Crime 99 (1978) (passage attributed to
Friar Cherubino of Siena's Rules of Marriage compiled between 1450 and 1481)).
70. Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths About the "Battered Woman's Defense:"
Towards a New Understanding, 19 Fordham Urb. L.J. 567, 568 (1992) (discussing the
historical background of violence against women).
Some authors view the first legitimate systematic protection for victims of domestic
violence as having evolved in the 17th century Puritan communities of the Massachu-
setts Bay Colony. See, e.g., Pleck, supra note 54, at 17-18 ("Neighbors were expected
to watch each other so that the sins of a few would not jeopardize the standing of the
entire community in God's eyes. Disorderly families defiled the institution of the
family, a husband who beat his wife . ..disgraced himself in the eyes of his
neighbors.").
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right to chastise his wife.7' Similarly, in 1864, a North Carolina court
concluded that, absent permanent injury or an excess of violence, a
state should refrain from interfering in cases of "domestic chastise-
ment.""2 In the early 19th century, spousal rape similarly was not con-
sidered criminal.73
In 1871, Alabama and Massachusetts became the first states to out-
law wife beating. 74 While most states made wife abuse illegal in the
early twentieth century, it was not regarded as a "real" crime, and
men were rarely prosecuted. By the first decade of the 20th century,
only thirty-five of the forty-six states had classified wife beating as
criminal assault by legislative action.76
Although wife beating was not statutorily sanctioned in the United
States, a review of American history reveals that the legal system pro-
vided women, especially married women, with few legal or political
71. Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 158 (1824) (upholding the role of
husband as disciplinarian and stating that the law should not upset that role); see also
Dobash and Dobash, supra note 56, at 62.
72. State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 262, 263 (1864) (ruling that the "law permits [a
husband] to use towards his wife such a degree of force as is necessary to control an
unruly temper and make her behave herself"); Dobash and Dobash, supra note 56, at
62.
73. Rapists married to their victims were not prosecuted. See Martin D. Schwartz,
The Spousal Exemption for Criminal Rape Prosecution, 7 Vt. L. Rev. 33, 35-38 (1982)
(discussing the history of the spousal rape exemption). All states have now abolished
the marital rape exemption. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.41.443 (repealed 1989); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17A, § 251 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994), § 252 (repealed 1989); Neb.
Rev. Stat. §§ 28-319 to -320 (1989); N.Y. Penal Law § 130.15 (repealed 1974). Some
states, however, retain a vestige of the marital rape exemption by treating it more
leniently than sexual assault crimes that take place outside the marriage. See, e.g.,
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1406 to -1406.01 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (categorizing first
offense sexual assault of spouse as a class six felony-subsequent offenses are class
two felonies; first offense sexual assault of person not a spouse is a class two felony);
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-61 (Michie 1988) (codifying a ten day reporting requirement as
well as requiring that for action to be maintained, spouses must be living apart or
serious physical injury must have been caused).
For a detailed discussion of marital rape laws, see John D. Harman, Consent, Harm,
and Marital Rape, 22 J. Fam. L. 423 (1984) (discussing the role of consent in marital
rape reform); Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U. Fla. L. Rev. 45 (1990) (proposing federal law abolishing
marital rape exemptions); Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1255 (1986) (arguing that marital
rape exemption and marital rape laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
74. Dobash and Dobash, supra note 56, at 63.
75. See Blackman, supra note 3, at 2 (describing mate abuse as marginalized and
not treated as a criminal offense); see also Allen Steinberg, The Criminal Courts and
the Transformation of Criminal Justice in Philadelphia, 1815-1874 (1982) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (explaining that because wife beating
was not specifically protected by actual legal statutes, many women did indeed take
their husbands to court throughout the nineteenth century).
76. Sigler, supra note 55, at 9; see generally Pleck, supra note 54, at 6 (tracing the
"ebbs and flows in attention to the social issue of family violence through different
periods of American History").
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rights. 7 For example, women could not vote until 1920." Histori-
cally, women were forbidden from entering into contracts. The com-
mon law principle of "coverture" provided that a wife could not own
property free from her husband's claim or control.79 Many states pro-
hibited women from becoming attorneys.m In custody disputes,
courts presumed that a child's best interest was to live with her father,
absent a compelling showing that the father did not have the financial
capacity to care for his child.8 ' Furthermore, as in several western
countries, men could legally discipline their dependents, including
77. William Blackstone, Commentaries, book I, ch. 15, at 145 (West 1897) ("By
marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law, that is, the legal existence of the
woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is incorporated into that of the hus-
band, under whose protection and cover she performs everything." (emphasis
added)).
Some late 19th century writers objected to the "political enfranchisement" of wo-
men claiming "it would weaken and finally break up and destroy the Christian fam-
ily." Presser & Zainaldin, supra note 63, at 558-59 (citing Orestes A. Brovnson, The
Woman Question, Articles I and II, reprinted from XVIII The Works of Orestes A.
Brownson 388-89, 403 (Henry F. Brownson, ed., 1885)). The dissolution of the family
union was cited as a reason not to provide women with political rights:
Extend now to women suffrage and eligibility;, give them the political right to
vote and to be voted for, render it feasible for them to enter the arena of
political strife, to become canvassers in elections and candidates for office,
and what remains of family union will soon be dissolved.
ld. at 558.
78. U.S. Const. amend. XIX, § 1 (extending the right to vote to women); see also
United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459) (uphold-
ing a guilty verdict of a woman who was indicted under an act of Congress making it
an offense for any person to vote for a representative without the legal right to vote).
79. See Black's Law Dictionary 366 (6th ed. 1990) (defining coverture and describ-
ing how the restrictions on a wife's legal capacity to own property were removed by
state Married Woman's Property Acts).
80. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (rejecting Myra
Bradwell's claim that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
Article IV, § 2, guaranteed her the right to obtain a license to practice law). In a
concurring opinion, Justice Bradley characterized the legal rights of women as practi-
cally nonexistent:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide differ-
ence in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman... The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.... It is the pre-
rogative of the legislator to prescribe regulations founded on nature, reason,
and experience for the due admission of qualified persons to professions and
callings demanding special skill and confidence. This fairly belongs to the
police power of the State; and, in my opinion, in view of the peculiar charac-
teristics, destiny, and mission of woman, it is within the province of the Leg-
islature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings shall be filled and
discharged by men, and shall receive the benefit of those energies and re-
sponsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are presumed to
predominate in the sterner sex.
Id. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
81. See, eg., The People ex rel Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399, 423 (N.Y. 1842)
(describing the current law favoring custody with a father as "in accordance with the
law of God").
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their wives.82 Such discipline often included the use of corporal vio-
lence.83 Arguably, because women lacked significant legal status,
there were no laws prohibiting violence against women.
C. Modem Society: Reforming the Standards of the Past
Economic and social changes over the last 150 years, including the
emergence of women into the paid work force, have challenged male
domination in society.' Laws now prohibit the existence of separate
rules that explicitly disadvantage women.85 While modem laws do not
espouse the standards of the past, the struggle for the recognition and
protection of women's equality in society is ongoing. Furthermore,
the eradication of legal support for battering has not meant full en-
forcement of laws against battering.86
Battered women often find themselves in emergency situations rely-
ing on a police force that gives domestic discord calls a low priority.8 7
Often, when police officers arrive at the scene of a domestic violence
call, they are unwilling to arrest the batterer.88 As one battered wo-
man explained, "I called the police one time. They not only did not
respond to the call, they called several hours later to ask if things had
'settled down.' I could have been dead by then!"' 89
Battered women traditionally have not only faced a lack of enforce-
ment by police of crimes involving domestic violence, but also a lack
of understanding in the courtroom: "The criminal justice system in its
general nonresponsiveness to the plight of battered women merely re-
82. See generally Rule of Thumb, supra note 68, at 2 (tracing the history of spousal
abuse from pre-Biblical times to the present). Even when a wife was legally shielded
from her husband's corporal abuse, he retained the right to "restrain the wife of her
liberty in case of any gross misbehavior." See Mercein, 3 Hill at 402.
83. See Rule of Thumb, supra note 68, at 2.
84. See generally Schechter, supra note 48, at 227 (presenting the struggles and
accomplishments of the battered women's movement).
85. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly proscribes
discrimination based on a person's sex. The statute provides: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's ... sex.. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
86. For an example of how battered women often have trouble convincing the
authorities to enforce laws in the context of domestic violence, see Thurman v. City of
Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) (acknowledging that "the police
consistently afforded lesser protection when the victim" of abuse was a woman as-
saulted by a spouse or a boyfriend).
87. Del Martin, Battered Wives 92-93 (1981) (discussing the fact that police are
slow to respond to domestic violence calls and often do nothing when they do show
up).
88. Id. at 93 (outlining the Police Training Academy of Michigan's procedure for
handling domestic calls); see also Battered Women 35 (Donna M. Moore ed., 1979)
(quoting a battered woman on the police response to her call for help).
89. Battered Women, supra note 88, at 35.
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flects the views held in the society at large."'9 Before courts were
willing to admit expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome,9'
a battered woman who fought back against her batterer had to craft a
defense to her actions that fit within the traditional legal notions of
justification or excuse.92 As one feminist scholar explains:
Substantive criminal law fails to account adequately for homi-
cides committed by women that do not fit the traditional male-pat-
terned homicide. A woman's acts might be understandable in light
of mitigating facts, yet may fall outside of substantive criminal law
doctrines such as passion and provocation, self-defense, insanity,
and so-called diminished capacity. She is forced to engineer a way
to present her reality within the confines of a structure that excludes
her life experience."
A battered woman, thus, had to attempt to portray her alleged crime
in a way that did not account for the particular dynamics of her life.
Without the option to explain her behavior in the context of the
battered woman syndrome, a battered woman criminal defendant was
forced to rely on traditional rules of evidence to admit testimony
about the specific dynamics of a battering relationship. Dr. Walker
has explained why such restrictions are particularly devastating to a
battered woman's case:
There is a fundamental difference between the way women tell of
their battering experiences and what is permitted under the male-
identified rules of evidence. Women tend to tell of the events in
question rooted in their context, by weaving a tale of patterns of
events and feelings in the context of how they happened. Rules of
evidence call for the recitation of discrete events separated from
feelings or opinions. Facts out of context may be acceptable, but
they do not convey the battered woman's experience. Expert wit-
nesses can tie together what the current evidentiary rules do not
allow the defendant to say. Until feminist legal scholars argue for
and attain reform in the rules of evidence, a battered woman will be
constrained from putting her case in front of the trier of fact 94
90. Id. at 80.
91. See infra part H (outlining the psychological component of the battered wo-
man syndrome).
92. See Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony,
and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. Ml1 L Rev. 45,45 (1994)
(detailing the "conflict inherent in demonstrating the 'reasonableness' of the defend-
ant's actions through the premise that she was psychologically impaired").
93. Laura E. Reece, Women's Defenses to Criminal Homicide and the Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsek The Need for Relocation of Difference, 1 UCLA Wo-
men's L.. 53 (1991) (citations omitted).
94. Lenore E. Walker, A Response to Elizabeth Al. Schneider's Describing and
Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Bat-
tering, 9 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 223-24 (1986).
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When courts began to admit expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome,95 battered women had an option to rely on expert testi-
mony directed solely to the phenomenon of intimate violence.96
Despite the increased awareness of the particular dynamics of bat-
tering relationships in both a social and legal context, traditional fe-
male stereotypes have not completely disappeared.97 Today, society is
increasingly aware of the extent of domestic violence,98 and laws no
longer sanction violence against women.9 9 Interfamilial abuse is gen-
erally viewed as a social and legal problem, not a private one.1°° In
many ways, society has recognized its responsibility and developed
programs to help victims of spousal abuse.10 But there is still work to
be done.
95. See infra note 208 (listing cases where expert testimony on the battered wo-
man syndrome was ruled admissible).
96. See infra part III (discussing the use of the battered woman syndrome in
court). But see Schopp, supra note 92, at 46 (arguing that the "battered woman syn-
drome may become a new stereotype if expert testimony regarding the syndrome
becomes so closely associated with self-defense by battered women that these defend-
ants must establish that they suffer from the syndrome in order to substantiate a
defense").
97. See Dowd, supra note 70, at 570. As one author notes:
Despite ... progress, changing the beliefs of society has been, and contin-
ues to be, extremely difficult.... [V]iolence has always been seen as "appro-
priate" only in male terms. A good man was ambitious, aggressive and in
control. A good woman, on the other hand, was demure, passive and sub-
missive. These stereotypes undoubtedly run contrary to the reality that in
some situations, the use of force by a woman is a necessary and acceptable
thing. Nonetheless, these perceptions of gender-related qualities have been
a natural extension of the stereotypes embedded in the psyche of a society
resisting the pressure of a women's movement dedicated to the achievement
of equality.
Id.
98. Sigler, supra note 55, at 1-2 (explaining the present climate surrounding mate
abuse as a result of decreased public acceptance of domestic violence and the in-
creased willingness to allow intervention).
99. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
100. See Blackman, supra note 3, at 1-27 (discussing intimate violence as changing
from a private to a public problem); Jane O'Reilly, Wife Beating: The Silent Crime,
Time, Sept. 5, 1983, at 23 (describing the problem of mate abuse as no longer viewed
as inevitable and private, and attributing the change, in part, to society's changing
views of women's roles and rights). But see Margolick, supra note 1, at A14 (reporting
on the events surrounding O.J. Simpson's arrest in 1989 for abusing his wife). As
reported, "When [police officer Edwards] moved to arrest Mr. Simpson.... Mr. Simp-
son dismissed the episode as a 'family matter."' Id.
101. See, e.g., Steven M. Morgan, Conjugal Terrorism: A Psychological and Com-
munity Treatment Model of Wife Abuse 42-54 (1982) (presenting two model pro-
grams developed to assist abused women); Lucile Cantoni, Family Trouble Clinic:
Family Service of Detroit and Wayne County, in Battered Women and Their Families
129 (Albert R. Roberts, D.S.W. ed., Springer, 1984) (discussing a service for women
which illustrates an effective police/social work cooperative effort to combat family
violence); V.C.P. Batterer's Intervention Program, class discussion with participants
of the Fordham School of Law Domestic Violence Clinic, including this author (Feb.
21, 1995) (discussing the necessity of community involvement in an effort to stop vio-
lence against women).
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As the public increasingly acknowledges the pervasiveness of do-
mestic violence in America-in part, as a result of wide-scale media
attention to the issue-the need to address specific concerns of bat-
tered women has increased. Such need is evidenced by increased calls
to domestic violence hotlines,"° growing dockets in family courts and
other forums designed to combat spousal abuse, and the existence of
domestic violence task forces in local police precincts, specifically cre-
ated to handle the increased number of domestic violence calls.1 3
Statistics show that, despite the media attention given to a woman
who kills her allegedly abusive husband, very few women in abusive
relationships fight back."°
Many advocates for battered women assert that violence against
women, particularly spousal abuse, is caused, in part, by an unwilling-
ness to challenge historical values regarding the nature of the tradi-
tional American family and American society.10 5 Thus, advocates'
efforts to eliminate spousal abuse have included not just programs
designed to give greater legal and social support to battered women,
but also challenges to the fundamental causes of violence by: re-
searching why battered women act in certain ways;1 6 theorizing about
the root causes of violence against women and how to prevent such
102. See, eg., Reilly, supra note 10, at B5 (citing the executive director of an agency
that serves victims of family violence who estimates that "there [has been] an upswing
of almost 30% in new callers to the agency since the Simpson trial began").
103. See, e.g., Rudolph W. Giuliani & William J. Bratton, Police Strategy No. 4:
Breaking the Cycle of Violence 8-9 (Apr. 26,1994) (outlining the new New York City
Police Department policy on domestic incidents, including the mandate to: "track and
record all calls for domestic incidents"; "refocus department resources"; "revise the
department's directives and procedures"; and "revise and expand training").
104. It is estimated that of the 1.4 to 6 million women who are beaten by an inti-
mate partner each year, only 800 to 1000 will be charged with the murder of their
companion. See Erich D. Andersen & Anne Read-Andersen, Constitutional Dimen-
sions of the Battered Woman Syndrome, 53 Ohio St. LJ. 363, 366 & n.16 (1992) (citing
to a study by the National Clearinghouse for Defense of Battered Women); see also
O'Reilly, supra note 100, at 23 (reporting that of the nearly six million women abused
by their mates, 2000 to 4000 will be beaten to death). See generally No More! Stop-
ping Domestic Violence, supra note 3, at 1-65 (addressing the issue of domestic vio-
lence from a feminist perspective and setting forth statistics about the pervasiveness
of the problem).
105. See Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles, Physical Violence in American
Families: Risk Factors and Adaptations to Violence in 8,145 Families at xvii (1989)
(explaining the impetus for writing books on the subject of domestic violence, includ-
ing the desire "to show that the major cause of these tragedies is to be found in the
nature of the American family and American society, and to make clear that it is
within our power to change... spouse abuse"); see also Hofeller, supra note 49, at 49-
79 (outlining the historical precedents for wife beating and the social factors that cur-
rently contribute to such abuse).
106. For examples of works discussing research regarding why battered women act
in certain ways, see the following: Edward W. Gondolf & Ellen R. Fisher, Battered
Women as Survivors: An Alternative to Treating Learned Helplessness 11-25 (1988);
The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 42-70; Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Wo-
men's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome,
21 Hofstra L. Rev. 1191 (1993).
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violence; 10 7 establishing support mechanisms for victims of domestic
violence;108 and educating the public about the pervasiveness of do-
mestic violence in society.10 9 In the legal arena, advocates have been
working to have the experiences of battered women reflected in the
substantive and procedural law," 0 and the idea that battered women's
experiences may be used by a defendant-batterer to escape responsi-
bility for his actions is a tragic irony.
II. THE BAT=ERED WOMAN SYNDROME
This part outlines the theory known as the battered woman syn-
drome-a psychological illustration of the impact of prolonged
spousal abuse. There are two elements to the theory: a cycle of vary-
ing degrees of violence in abusive relationships, and a phenomenon
described as "learned helplessness" that is observed in victims of do-
mestic abuse. This part initially describes the numerous myths about
battered women. Dr. Walker formulated the battered woman syn-
drome, in part, in an effort to dispel such myths and to understand
better the responses to prolonged spousal abuse.
A. Myths About Battered Women
When a battered woman is scrutinized in a legal arena, whether as a
defendant or as a witness for the prosecution, she must face the pros-
pect that jurors and judges may view her actions as counter-intuitive.
Such fact finders may rely improperly on stereotypes or myths about
107. For examples of books that address the root causes of violence, see Richard J.
Gelles & Claire P. Cornell, International Perspectives on Family Violence (1983) and
Pleck, supra note 54. See also Martin Blinder, M.D., Lovers, Killers, Husbands and
Wives (1985) (describing through case studies the unconscious psychodynamics of
homicide and discussing the function of psychiatric testimony within the American
criminal justice system).
108. See, e.g., Jennifer B. Fleming, Stopping Wife Abuse: A Guide to the Emo-
tional, Psychological, and Legal Implications for the Abused Woman and Those Help-
ing Her (1979) (furnishing insight, information, skills and knowledge to people who
want to provide help to battered women); Hofeller, supra note 49, at 103-13 (outlining
how to best combat wife abuse).
109. See, e.g., Mildred D. Pagelow, Woman-Battering: Victims and Their Exper-
iences (Sage Library of Social Research 1982); Murray A. Straus et a., Behind Closed
Doors: Violence in the American Family (1980) (presenting some of the main find-
ings of research into family violence in an effort to make the general public aware of
the many incidents and psychological consequences of physical abuse); see also Straus
& Gelles, supra note 105 (compiling various articles on domestic violence specifically
for the scholarly reader).
110. See infra part II; see also Roberta Flowers, Does it Cost Too Much? A 'Differ-
ence' Look at J.E.B. v. Alabama, 64 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming Nov. 1995) (criti-
cizing the holding in J.E.B. and advocating for allowing gender to be a factor in thejury selection process); Elizabeth Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-
Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 Women's Rts. L.
Rep. 195, 214 (1986) (discussing the emergence of the difference approach, which
allows juries to take into account the different "experiences and perceptions" of bat-
tered women).
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battered women when determining the reasonableness of her behav-
ior. Despite a growing awareness of the domestic violence epidemic
that plagues our society, many people still question why a battered
woman does not leave an abusive relationship after the first violent
episode."' Many people have difficulty understanding why battered
women do not fight back, walk out, call the police after each incident,
go to the hospital, or reveal the abuse to friends or family members.1 2
Because of the failure to understand why battered women do not
leave an abusive relationship, many myths surround "the battered wo-
man.' 113 A battered woman is often perceived as a masochist 14 or as
someone who deserves to be hit because she provoked her husband.
Yet, she is also faulted for not aggressively prosecuting her batterer,
and is criticized for not availing herself of an opportunity to have her
husband arrested and put in jail." 5 Other myths suggest that many
women are not truly subjected to severe violence, but tend to exagger-
ate the extent of the abuse. Many believe that spousal abuse only
occurs among lower socio-economic groups,"16 that a battered woman
generally has a past history of interfamilial abuse," 7 that a battered
woman will remarry another violent man," 8 or that a woman is prone
to use false accusations against her husband to gain a personal benefit
111. See, e.g., Diana Patton, "He Never Hit Me"-The Need for Expert Testimony in
Domestic Violence Cases, Ariz. Att'y (State Bar of Arizona), Jan. 30, 1994, at 10 (dis-
cussing the various myths held by the public that an expert witness should dispel at
trial: (1) the victim is a masochist; (2) the woman provoked or deserved the beating;
and (3) the battered woman is free to leave the battering situation at any time).
112. Although people often do not understand why a woman is seemingly passive
to the hand of her abuser, many juries are reluctant to acquit a woman who does fight
back and subsequently kills her attacker. See Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Bar-
tering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 Alb. L Rev. 973, 973
(1995) (documenting the number of women who have been jailed for killing a partner
who physically assaulted them).
113. In her book, The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 18-35, Dr. Walker also
discusses a series of myths associated with battered women and the characteristics of
those women:
The myths included beliefs that battering was not widespread; that it did not
happen to middle-class white women; that battered women were masochists;
that they could leave their batterers at any time; and that such women de-
served to be beaten. Among other things, the women themselves were said
to suffer from low self-esteem, to harbor traditional values about relation-
ships, to accept responsibility for the abuse and to believe they were
isolated.
Dowd, supra note 70, at 573 (citations omitted) (discussing Lenore Walker's work).
114. Hofeller, supra note 49, at 2 (discussing the many myths and stereotypes that
exist about wife abuse in the context of three case studies).
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 3.
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such as custody of the couple's children, a favorable divorce settle-
ment, or a "convenient" justification for homicide. 119
Advocates in the battered women's movement have worked dili-
gently for the past twenty years to dispel the above myths about bat-
tered women.12 0 As a result of these efforts, public awareness of
domestic violence has increased, and many legislative and judicial re-
forms have been enacted to combat violence against women.' 2 1 Yet,
while awareness of the problem of domestic violence has increased, 122
119. Most commonly made statements about battered women and domestic vio-
lence are considered false. See id. (highlighting various myths and asserting that
"[e]ach of these statements is false-a common misconception about wife abuse.").
120. People who are unaware of the research concerning battered women and the
root causes of domestic violence are not the only ones to espouse such myths. As one
researcher noted, "the researcher in the field soon becomes acquainted with common
myths and stereotypes subscribed to by many in the general population, the helping
agencies, and the criminal justice system." Pagelow, supra note 109, at 54.
Researcher Mary Daley Pagelow outlines and explores some myths and stereotypes
about battered women, and compares them to actual data:
(1) "These are pathological individuals"
(A) Masochistic women
(B) Weak women
(C) Batterer is "sick"
(D) Recidivists-the women "seek out" the batterers
(2) "But what did she do to provoke him?"
(A) Justified force: He is a victim of nagging
(B) Battered women must somehow be at fault
(3) "Why did she stay?"
(A) Why complain now? (revenge-seeking)
(B) What did she "get out of" the relationship?
(C) Trade-off for "meal ticket"
(4) "But they never press charges"(A) Frustrations of the criminal justice system
(B) Weak-willed women do not follow through
(5) "The problem is restricted to the lower classes."
Id. Despite the fact that the myths are widely held, most have been found to be
incorrect empirically. According to Pagelow, "Based on quantitative survey data sup-
plemented by qualitative data that enriches understanding, the investigator finds
these popular assumptions are generally untrue." IL at 87.
The fact that many myths receive "popularity and public acceptance serves to vic-
timize the victims further by stigmatizing them or helping to keep them locked in
their violent relationships." Id. at 88.
121. See infra note 208 (listing state court cases that have allowed evidence of bat-
tered woman syndrome); see also supra note 103 (citing to New York City's recent
adoption of a police strategy to help break the cycle of domestic violence). Judicial
reforms include recent decisions holding police departments liable for inadequate
protection of battered women. See, e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp.
1521, 1527 (D. Conn. 1984). In Thurman, the plaintiffs, a battered woman and her
son, brought an action in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and
1988, as well as the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution,
alleging that their constitutional rights were violated by the nonfeasance or malfea-
sance of various official duties by the defendant police force. Id at 1524.
122. Unfortunately, even the increased awareness is limited. The public's percep-
tion of the issue comes directly from high profile media cases involving severe abuse
such as Hedda Nussbaum or Tracey Thurman. See, e.g., Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at
1524-26; see also People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845, 848 (N.Y. 1992), aff'g, 170
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an understanding of the psychology of battered women has not neces-
sarily followed.
B. Psychological Explanations of the Effect of Prolonged Abuse on
Battered Women
The need to understand the psychological responses to battering is
heightened as society becomes more aware of the prevalence of do-
mestic violence. Recent studies regarding the pervasiveness of do-
mestic violence in America suggest that between four million and six
million incidents of domestic violence against women occur each
year.123 According to a study by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
A.D.2d 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (upholding defendant's conviction for manslaughter
in the death of his adopted daughter Lisa Steinberg). Less severe cases of abuse also
result in psychological phenomena, but are less widely acknowledged.
123. Women and Violence" Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1990) (testimony of Angela Browne, Ph.D.); see also
sources cited supra note 104.
In the introduction to the 1979 book, Battered Women, Donna Moore lists a series
of statistical data collected from around the country. While acknowledging that "the
data are haphazard," she summarizes selected data "as an indication of the scope of
battering" in this country. Donna M. Moore, Editor's Introduction: An Overview of
the Problem, in Battered Women 7, 13-14 (Donna M. Moore ed., 1979). The data are
as follows:
Kansas City, Missouri, 1976. The Police Department revealed that 90% of
the city's family homicides had been preceded by at least one call to the
Police Department, and in 50% of those cases the police had been called five
or more times.
Washtenaw County, Michigan. Thirty-five percent of all assault cases are
wife assault.
Dade County, Florida. Over a nine-month period, 1,000 cases of battered
women were handled.
Montgomery County, Maryland. The Wife Assault Task Force handled
650 incidents during its first year of operation.
Michigan. One county reported 42.4% of all assault complaints in a five-
month period were wife assault.
Brooklyn Legal Services, 1976. Fifty-seven percent of the women filing
for divorce complained of physical assaults for approximately four years
before seeking divorce.
Cleveland, Ohio, 1971. Thirty-seven percent of females filing for divorce
complained of physical abuse when filing.
Marvin E. Wolfgang studied 588 cases of criminal homicide in 1958 and
concluded that 87% of all female victims were slain by males and 84% of
female offenders slew males. The predominant reasons for such murders
were sex, love, and family matters. Wolfgang stated that slayings with exces-
sive degrees of violence predominate in the home and are most likely to
involve a spousal relationship in which the wife is the victim of the husband's
brutal beating.
Donald T. Lunde reported in Psycology Today in 1975 that approxi-
mately 40% of homicides in the United States are spouses killing spouses.
Nationwide estimates predict that up to 60% of American families will
experience interspousal violence during the course of a relationship.
The latest study by Straus et al. found violence in 28% of all American
families. Lenore Walker estimates that violence occurs between 50% of all
American marital partners.
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a woman is beaten every eighteen seconds." The Surgeon General
maintains that domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to wo-
men within certain age brackets.2 5 Many commentators suggest that
more women in the United States are injured by their husbands or
boyfriends than are injured by rape, muggings, and car accidents
combined.'2
6
There are numerous psychological and sociological studies docu-
menting the effect of persistent abuse on the victims of domestic vio-
lence.'2 7 The theory most frequently relied upon in criminal cases is
Dr. Lenore E. Walker's "battered woman syndrome."' 28 Dr. Walker
theorizes that many battered women suffer from distinct psychological
and behavioral symptoms as a result of relationships in which they are
subjected to physical, psychological, or sexual abuse over a prolonged
Nationwide, the FBI estimates that wife abuse occurs three times as fre-
quently as sexual assault, and they further estimate that it is reported less
than 10% of the time. This would mean that wife abuse occurs approxi-
mately every 18 seconds somewhere in the United States.
ld. (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 14.
125. Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 Harv.
L. Rev., 1498, 1501 (1993) (citing Antonia C. Novello, From the Surgeon General, U.S.
Public Health Service, 267 JAMA 3132, 3132 & n.4 (1992)) ("[A] recent study found
violence to be the 'leading cause of injuries to women ages 15 through 44 years."').
126. Nancy Gibbs, 'Til Death Do Us Part, Time, Jan. 18, 1993, at 38, 41 (discussing
the pervasiveness of domestic violence as well as battered women's lack of choices
and the public and prosecutorial resistance to legal and social reform).
127. See infra part IV.B (describing an alternative theory of the psychological ef-
fects of domestic violence). See generally Sharon A. Allard, Rethinking Battered Wo-
man Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA Women's L.J. 191 (1991)
(redefining the battered woman syndrome to take into account women's diverse cul-
tural distinctions); Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic
Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 1191
(1993) (redefining the battered woman syndrome due, in part, to the fact that bat-
tered women have diverse psychological realities that can not be limited to one partic-
ular profile); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (discussing "battering as a struggle for
power and control and show[ing] how legal analysis can help reveal the control issue
by naming separation assault and building litigation strategies to redefine the issue of
separation"); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Hearing Women Not Being Heard: On Carol
Gilligan's Getting Civilized and the Complexity of Voice, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 33, 34
(1994) ("I have explored the difficulties that the concept of 'battered woman syn-
drome' poses because it is misheard or misunderstood 'as reinforcing stereotypes of
women as passive, sick, powerless and victimized."' (citation omitted)).
128. See generally The Battered Woman, supra note 7 (describing Dr. Walker's the-
ory); The Battered Woman Syndrome, supra note 8 (same).
The battered woman syndrome is arguably the most widely recognized theory in
the context of a battered woman's criminal trial because it provides a viable explana-
tion to accompany her claim of self-defense. See infra part II.B.1 (outlining why bat-
tered women act in certain ways as a result of prolonged abuse); see also supra note 19
(discussing the requisite standard to support a claim of self-defense). It is important
to recognize that there are other viable explanations of the behavior and state of mind
of battered women which can also be relevant to certain legal assertions. One such
theory is the survivor theory. See discussion infra part IV.B.
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period of time.'2 9 For example, the Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders IV acknowledges that domestic battering may trig-
ger symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.130 Such acknowledge-
ment is consistent with Dr. Walker's findings according to the battered
woman syndrome.
1. Components of the Battered Woman Syndrome
There are two distinct elements to the battered woman syndrome:
first, the abusive relationship follows a cycle of violence; 131 and, sec-
ond, the victim exhibits symptoms of a phenomenon known as
"learned helplessness."' 32 According to the syndrome, the term "bat-
tered woman" describes a woman who suffers violence at the hand of
her partner, yet remains in the relationship despite repeated incidents
of abuse.133 While the battered woman syndrome outlines the com-
mon characteristics shared by battered women, the theory does not
assert that distinct character traits exist in women before the abuse
occurs that make certain women prone to such abuse." Rather, it is
impossible to predict who may or may not become a battered woman
129. Terrifying Love, supra note 8, at 42-47; The Battered Woman Syndrome, supra
note 8, at 95-97; see also Susan Murphy, Assisting the Jury in Understanding Victim-
ization: Expert Psychological Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome and Rape
Trauma Syndrome, 25 Colum. 3.1 & Soc. Probs. 277, 295 (1992) (summarizing the
dynamics of Dr. Walker's "battered woman syndrome").
130. American Psychiatric Association, The Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders 425 (4th ed. 1994). The Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders is a compilation by the American Psychiatric Association of symptoms of a
wide range of recognized psychological disorders. See also Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d
1, 6-7 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (recognizing battered woman syndrome as an implied
sub-category of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in the Diagnostic & Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders M).
131. Terrifying Love, supra note 8, at 42.
132. Id. at 50-51.
133. Lenore E. Walker, Battered Women and Learned Helplessness, in Women and
the Law 601, 601 (Mary Joe Frug ed., 1992). As one commentator explains, battered
women are not distinctly recognizable as such:
The "typical" battered woman is not an uneducated woman living in pov-
erty. Rather, battered women are found in all age groups, races, income
levels, and educational backgrounds. The similarities are found in their val-
ues and attitudes. They usually have a poor self-image and low self-esteem.
Battered women often state that they feel at fault for not being able to stop
their batterer's behavior and blame themselves for their failing relationship
with the batterer. Unfortunately, guilt and shame often prevent them from
seeking outside help.
Jeanne-Marie Bates, Comment, Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome
in Maryland, 50 Md. L. Rev. 920, 925-26 (1991) (citations omitted); see supra note 3
(defining battered women as used in this Note).
134. The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 58. Dr. Walker describes the distinction
between women who have been battered and those who have not: "Most women in a
sexist society experience similar battering incidents. The difference between most wo-
men and battered women is that the battered woman is more prone to the learned
helplessness syndrome; she has learned that she is powerless to prevent [further vio-
lence]." Ld.
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in the future, and any woman has the potential to become a battered
woman should she find herself in a relationship with an abusive
partner. 35
The term "battered woman syndrome" refers to a psychological ex-
planation of the process of victimization of battered women. Dr.
Walker, who first introduced the syndrome in her 1979 book, The Bat-
tered Woman, defines the battered woman syndrome as a discernible
pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms observed in women
living in abusive relationships. 36 The author posits that, after pro-
longed spousal abuse, a battered woman has a psychological inability
to leave the abusive relationship with the batterer; the "rationale is
the construct of learned helplessness."37
135. Such an assertion is understandably difficult for many women who have never
been victims of domestic violence to comprehend or believe. See Deborrah Ann Klis,
Reforms to Criminal Defense Instructions: New Patterned Jury Instructions Which Ac-
count for the Experience of the Battered Woman Who Kills Her Battering Mate, 24
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 131, 133-37 (1994) (citing both a California and a New Jersey
case that each discussed expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome). Ac-
cording to one definition of a battered woman:
Battered women include wives or women in any form of an intimate rela-
tionship. In order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. If the woman remains in the rela-
tionship after the second incident, she is defined as a battered woman.
Id. at 137; see also The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at xv (defining a battered
woman as a woman who is "repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psycho-
logical behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do
without any concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any
form of intimate relationships with men."). But see Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particu-
larity and Generality. Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work On Wo-
man-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 520, 530 (1992). Schneider states:
First, in contrast with other descriptions of harm to women, "battered wo-
man" describes the victim and focuses on her qualities. A woman is-or is
not-a "battered woman." The phrase is reductive in that it totally defines
the life experience of the particular woman: a "battered woman" is nothing
more than a "battered woman."
Id.
136. Terrifying Love, supra note 8, at 4. Dr. Walker developed her theory of bat-
tered woman syndrome through research funded by the National Institutes of Mental
Health and conducted at the Battered Woman Research Center in Denver, Colorado.
Id. at 8. Her research involved interviews with 400 battered women who had exper-
ienced 1600 battering incidents. See infra note 138 (discussing Dr. Walker's research).
137. Walker, supra note 133, at 601. See discussion infra part II.B.l.b.
Learned helplessness is a theory that was first developed by experimental psycholo-
gist Martin Seligman in experiments with dogs and other animals. The Battered Wo-
man, supra note 7, at 45-46. Dr. Walker describes Seligman's research in the
following way:
Seligman and his researchers placed dogs in cages and administered elec-
trical shocks at random and varied intervals. These dogs quickly learned
that no matter what response they made, they could not control the
shock.... When nothing they did stopped the shocks, the dogs ceased any
further voluntary activity and became compliant, passive, and submissive.
Id. at 46.
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a. Cycle of Violence
Dr. Walker discovered a three phase "cycle of violence" in many of
the cases of the battered women she studied.138 The distinct phases
include a period of tension building and an "acute battering incident"
followed by a "calm loving respite" or honeymoon period.1 39 The dis-
tinct phases she observed varied in length and intensity depending on
the individuals involved" °
The initial tension building phase includes verbal abuse and minor
battering incidents.' 4 ' Minor incidents include slaps, pinches, and ver-
bal and psychological abuse.' 42 During this phase, the woman typi-
cally tries to pacify her abuser by using calming techniques that have
proven successful in the past. 43 She may try to be especially kind, or
merely attempt to keep out of the batterer's way.'" The woman's
primary objective during the tension building phase is to prevent the
escalation of violence.145 Because the woman appears passive during
this stage, the batterer is not forced to control his behavior and his
abusiveness is reinforced.146
The second phase begins when the violence and verbal abuse erupt
into an acute battering incident. This phase is "characterized by the
uncontrollable discharge of the tensions that have built up during
phase one."' 4 7 It is during this stage in the cycle that women are sub-
138. The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 55. Dr. Walker stated that her original
research did not conclude that battering was constant in abusive relationships, but
neither was the violence as random as people believed. "Rather. there was a definite
pattern seen in two-thirds of the 1,600 battering incidents reported by the 400 women
interviewed for the research study." Walker, Syndrome and Self-Defense. supra note
8, at 330 (footnotes omitted); see also Charles J. Aron, In Defense of Battered Women
Is Justice Blind? The Federal Justice System Often Ignores a Woman's Troubled Past,
Hum. Rts., Fall 1993, at 14, 14 (section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities of the
American Bar Association). Dr. Walker is quoted in the article:
[N]early half of the women currently in prisons across the country have been
battered and "committed the crime for which they are being punished to
avoid further beating. Forging checks to pay his bills, stealing food or other
items that he denied the children, selling drugs to keep his supply filled,
hurting someone else so he didn't hurt her, were all acts committed under
the control of the batterer's threat of or actual violence."
Id.
139. The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 55.
140. Id
141. IL at 56.
142. Terrifying Love, supra note 8, at 42.
143. The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 56; see also infra notes 290-99 and ac-
companying text (explaining the sort of coping behavior described by Dr. Walker in
the context of a woman's continuous attempts to survive in the face of severe abuse,
rather than as exhibiting traits of learned helplessness).
144. Terrifying Love, supra note 8, at 42.
145. Md at 43.
146. See id. Dr. Walker describes a woman's desire to prevent escalating violence
as a "double-edged sword." While she may delay more severe violence, her passivity
is interpreted to legitimize the batterer's belief that he has the right to hit her. Id.
147. The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 59.
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jected to brutal violence and suffer the most severe injuries. 14 8 If a
woman is killed by her batterer, it will generally happen during this
phase of violence. 49 Phase two incidents usually last from two to
twenty-four hours. 5 ° The violence during this phase is described as
unpredictable, yet inevitable.' From the woman'sperspective, phase
two is a time of constant fear and sense of danger.152 Most women are
aware that their batterer's violence is uncontrollable, and believe that
any attempt to reason with him would be futile.1 53 Thus, many wo-
men try to protect themselves and mitigate the abuse by not resisting
the batterer's violence.' 4
The third phase involves a tranquil period of loving contrition in
which the batterer exhibits apologetic and conciliatory behavior. 5 5
He is affectionate and tends to act in ways that resemble his attitude
when the couple first met and fell in love.'5 6 The woman experiences
a sense of relief, often believing his promise that he will "never do it
again.""' This stage of the cycle is particularly invidious because the
batterer, acting like a model husband, fools both the outside world
148. See id. at 59-65. Although many women are seriously injured during this
phase, they often wait days to seek medical treatment. Id. at 63. Some do not seek
help at all. Id, at 64.
149. See Terrifying Love, supra note 8, at 43. It is the above pattern of violence that
defense attorney Johnnie L. Cochran Jr. stated Dr. Walker did not find in the rela-
tionship between OJ. Simpson and Nicole Brown Simpson. See supra note 38 (dis-
cussing Cochran's opening statement).
150. The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 60.
151. Id. at 60-61.
152. See id. at 60.
153. Id. at 62.
154. Terrifying Love, supra note 8, at 44. In her original study, Dr. Walker reports
that many women stated that they would often attempt to provoke an acute battering
incident. Dr. Walker explains that "[w]hen this occurs, the couple usually has been
involved in battering behavior for a long period of time. The woman often senses that
the period of inevitability is very close, and she cannot tolerate her terror, her anger,
or anxiety any longer." The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 60. The woman is also
aware that the next phase of calm will follow the acute battering incident. Id.
To note, not all battered women respond by remaining passive during this phase of
violence. As is evidenced by the reliance on the battered woman syndrome in the
prosecution of women for killing their abusive partners, the theory is applicable to
those women as well. See infra note 208 (listing court cases where battered woman
syndrome evidence has been ruled admissible).
155. Terrifying Love, supra note 8, at 44. Batterers often promise they will never
be violent again and beg for forgiveness. Id. Women frequently convince themselves
that this time he has truly changed. Id. at 45; see also The Battered Woman, supra
note 7, at 65-70.
156. Terrifying Love, supra note 8, at 45. Understandably, many batterers are
viewed by those who know them as model husbands-making it all the more difficult
for battered women to break free of the continued brutality.
The fact that, at this stage, batterers do act like doting husbands, and not like vio-
lent abusers, argues against an expert's proclamation that a defendant-batterer does
not fit the profile of an abusive husband. See infra part IV.C (discussing the need for
psychological research on men who batter).
157. Terrifying Love, supra note 8, at 45.
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and his wife into believing that he has changed. According to experts,
while the woman is relieved that the abuse has abated, "It is in this
phase of loving contrition that the battered woman is most thoroughly
victimized psychologically."1 5 Inevitably, the psychological abuse in-
tensifies, and the cycle of violence recurs.159
Dr. Walker theorizes' 60 that the cyclical nature of battering may ex-
plain why a battered woman does not simply leave her abuser: "Un-
derstanding this cycle is very important if we are to learn how to stop
or prevent battering incidents. This cycle also helps explain how bat-
tered women become victimized, how they fall into learned helpless-
ness behavior,16' and why they do not attempt to escape."'' 6 Often
the woman is genuinely convinced her mate will change his abusive
behavior. 63 Typically, he does not. 64 Regardless of whether she be-
lieves him, a woman's response to the cycle of violence varies. The
responses of battered women range from silence to denial to demoral-
ization and degradation.'6 The latter response is more likely to occur
after many cycles, as the woman realizes she has once again been
fooled by her batterer into believing he will change.166
158. Id Specifically, Dr. Walker explains that women and their batterers become
extremely emotionally dependent upon one another. Both may perceive death as
preferable to separation. Moreover, many women do not leave because they feel that
they are ultimately responsible for their batterer's stability. The women's assessment
of their significance to the batterer is not unfounded. In one study cited by Dr.
Walker, 10% of the batterers committed suicide after the women finally left. Id.
159. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (suggesting that in order to be classi-
fled as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least
twice).
160. Although Dr. Walker was the first to formulate the battered woman syn-
drome, many authors have written on and attempted to expound upon the syndrome.
See discussion infra note 167 (listing various works on the phenomenon of battering);
see also Allard, supra note 127 (offering a redefinition of the battered woman syn-
drome); Dutton, supra note 127 (same).
161. See infra part II.B.l.b (discussing the phenomenon of learned helplessness).
162. The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 55.
163. See id. at 67. "The battered woman wants to believe that she will no longer
have to suffer abuse." l In order to allow herself to believe the batterer will change,
the "battered woman chooses to believe that the behavior she sees during phase three
signifies what her man is really like." It at 68.
164. See id. at 55-67. "Battered women are not constantly being abused, nor is their
abuse inflicted at totally random times. One of the most striking discoveries in the
interviews was of a definite battering cycle.... ." Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
165. See generally id at 55-70 (describing various responses to prolonged abuse).
Many women minimize the extent of their injuries. Id at 63; see also Karil S. Klingbeil
& Vicki D. Boyd, Emergency Room Intervention: Detection, Assessment, and Treat-
ment, in Battered Women and Their Families 7, 9 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 1984) (dis-
cussing how battered women remember and report abuse as being less severe and less
frequent than actually experienced).
166. The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 69. "If she has been through several
cycles already, the knowledge that she has traded her psychological and physical
safety for this temporary dream state adds to her self-hatred and embarrassment." Id.
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Constant subjection to chronic abuse permanently affects the
psyche of the victim.' 67 Different theories of human behavior attempt
to explain precisely why battered women do not leave abusive rela-
tionships."6 Some researchers believe that women do not leave be-
cause they perceive escape as impossible: they cannot safely predict
their behavior's effect on their batterer.169 Others blame society's in-
eptitude in providing help to battered women as a force that keeps
women in the battering relationships for a prolonged period. 170 Still
others fault a sexist society as the facilitator of abuse against wo-
men.' 7' These theorists argue that domestic violence will not cease
until it becomes truly socially unacceptable. 7 As one commentator
noted, "[domestic violence] will not become socially unacceptable un-
til the entire society is committed to real equality for women, and sex-
ism is universally understood to be the name of a dangerous social
disease that poisons individual relationships as well as the quality of
167. There are numerous books on the phenomenon of battering. See, e.g., Angela
Browne, When Battered Women Kill (1987); Battered Women (Donna M. Moore ed.,
1976); Pagelow, supra note 109; The Battered Woman Syndrome, supra note 8; Wo-
men's Self-Defense Cases: Theory and Practice (Elizabeth Bochnak ed., 1981). See
generally Nathan A. Rosen, Battered Wives: A Comprehensive Annotated Bibliogra-
phy of Articles, Books and Statutes in the United States of America (1988) (listing
and briefly describing numerous works on the subject of domestic violence); Carolyn
F. Wilson, Violence Against Women: An Annotated Bibliography (1981) (same).
168. See infra part IV.B; The Battered Woman, supra note 7; Stark, supra note 112,
at 975-76 (arguing that the battered woman syndrome provides an "inaccurate, reduc-
tionist, and potentially demeaning representation of woman battering" and offering
an alternative framework that "emphasizes the batterer's pattern of coercion and con-
trol rather than his violent acts or their effect on victim psychology").
169. See supra part II.B (discussing the battered woman syndrome).
170. See infra part IV.B (discussing the survivor theory).
171. See generally Martin, supra note 87 (discussing the battered woman syndrome
in socio-political terms). Scholars theorize regarding why women stay in abusive
relationships:
[Martin's] research indicates... that these women do not remain in the
relationship because they basically like being beaten. They have difficulty
leaving because of complex psychosocial reasons. Many stay because of eco-
nomic, legal, and social dependence. Others are afraid to leave because they
have no safe place to go. Police, courts, hospitals, and social service agencies
do not offer them adequate protection. Psychologists tend to counsel them
to keep the family together at any cost, which often turns out to be their
mental health and sometimes their lives.
The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 43 (discussing Del Martin's research findings).
172. Fleming, supra note 108, at 228. According to some scholars:
The feminist analysis of wife beating is, at heart, a critique of patriarchy.
The central argument is that the brutalization of an individual wife by an
individual husband is not an individual or "family" problem. It is simply one
manifestation of the system of male domination of women that has existed
historically and cross-culturally. Societal tolerance of wife beating is a re-
flection of patriarchal norms that, more generally, support male dominance
in marriage. Traditional marriage, in turn, is a central element of patriarchal
society.
Straus & Gelles, supra note 105, at 384.
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life in the community."' 73 Keeping the ultimate goal in mind, a first
step to eradicating violence against women is to attempt to under-
stand the behavior of battered women, and work to remove the stigma
of abnormality from battered women. 74 Understanding the behavior
of battered women is vital for the battered woman who is being
judged in a legal context. By moving the perception of a battered
woman's responses within a range of reasonable behavior, a jury may
better view a defendant battered woman as justified in her actions.'"
b. Learned Helplessness
The learned helplessness' 76 theory comprises the second component
of Dr. Walker's battered woman syndrome.'" Based on social learn-
ing and cognitive and motivational theoretical principles, the theory
explains the psychological paralysis that perpetuates a battered wo-
man's status as victim. 7 Dr. Walker did not create the theory of
learned helplessness; rather, she adapted the research findings of ex-
perimental psychologist Martin Seligman to the realm of battered wo-
men.179 Dr. Seligman's theory has three basic factors: "information
about what will happen; thinking or cognitive representation about
what will happen (learning, expectation, belief, perception); and be-
havior toward what does happen.'1
Dr. Seligman developed the theory of learned helplessness'," after a
series of experiments where he inflicted repetitious, unavoidable elec-
trical shocks to caged dogs.' 2 When the dogs were unable to avoid
the shock despite every attempt to escape, they eventually became
passive and stopped trying to resist-instead becoming complacent to
173. Fleming, supra note 108, at 228.
174. See supra part II.A (discussing myths about battered women and misconcep-
tions regarding why battered women do not leave abusive relationships after the first
violent episode).
175. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375-77 (NJ. 1984) (ruling that evidence
on the battered woman syndrome can be helpful to a jury in determining whether the
battered woman acted reasonably).
176. See generally Martin E.P. Seligman, Helplessness: On Depression, Develop-
ment, and Death 75-106 (1975) (describing the symptoms, cures, and preventions of
the learned helplessness model of depression).
177. See The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 43.
178. See id at 47.
179. Id. at 45-54.
180. Id- at 47. Dr. Walker points out that "[it is the second or cognitive representa-
tion component where the faulty expectation that response and outcome are in-
dependent occurs. This is the point at which cognitive, motivational, and emotional
disturbances originate." Id
181. See discussion supra note 137.
182. Id at 45-46; Seligman, supra note 176, at 23-28. Dr. Seligman also performed
similar tests on cats, fish, and rats. Idt at 28-31. While the rats were slower to show
signs of passivity after inescapable shock treatment, they did show signs of helpless-
ness when the response called for was somewhat unnatural and required "deliberate"
performance. Idt at 29.
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the discomfort.'83 Even when the dogs were later taught to avoid the
shocks by moving to the other side of the cage, the dogs "remained
passive, refused to leave, and did not avoid the shock."'"
Dr. Walker posits that learned helplessness occurs in a domestic vi-
olence situation when a battered woman cannot predict her own
safety because, regardless of her conduct, she is faced with the bat-
terer's random and unpredictable abusive behavior. 8 5 Learned help-
lessness forces battered women to choose "behavioral responses that
will have the highest predictability of an effect within the known, or
familiar, situation; they avoid responses-like escape, for instance-
that launch them into the unknown."' 86 Dr. Walker adapted Selig-
man's theory to her study of battered women, using it to explain why
women do not leave battering relationships: 8 7
Once we believe we cannot control what happens to us, it is diffi-
cult to believe we can ever influence it, even if later we experience a
favorable outcome. This concept is important for understanding
why battered women do not attempt to free themselves from a bat-
tering relationship. Once the women are operating from a belief of
helplessness, the perception becomes reality and they become pas-
sive, submissive, 'helpless."
88
183. See The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 46. "Similar experiments have been
performed on other species, including cats, fish, rodents, birds, and primates and
humans, with the same kind of results." Id.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 48 ("Women who have learned to expect battering as a way of life
have learned that they cannot influence its occurrence.").
Dr. Walker ists seven factors that occur during a battering relationship that are
associated with the development of learned helplessness:
1. A pattern of violence, particularly the occurrence of the Cycle of Vio-
lence... [coupled with the] observable escalation in frequency and severity
of the abuse ....
2. Sexual abuse of the woman.
3. Jealousy, overpossessiveness, intrusiveness of the batterer, and isolation
of the woman.
4. Threats to hurt or kill the woman.
5. Psychological torture [including verbal degradation, denial of powers, iso-
lation, monopolizing perceptions, occasional indulgences, hypnosis, threats
to kill, induced debility, drugs or alcohol].
6. Violence correlates (including the woman knowing about the man's vio-
lence against others, including children, animals, pets, or inanimate objects).
7. Alcohol or drug abuse by the man or woman.
Terrifying Love, supra note 8, at 52.
186. Terrifying Love, supra note 8, at 50-51. Dr. Walker also explains that a bat-
tered woman is often at the gravest risk of death or serious injury when she does
attempt to leave. According to statistics, the risk of homicide is 75% higher if a wo-
man attempts to leave her batterer. Joan M. Schroeder, Using Battered Woman Syn-
drome Evidence in the Prosecution of a Batterer, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 553, 582 n.33 (1991)
(citation omitted).
187. The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 47.
188. Id. As one commentator explains:
To understand learned helplessness, one must focus on an individual's beliefs
regarding the situation [he or she is] in. As in the case of [post-traumatic
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The sense of utter defenselessness caused by sporadic brutality, min-
gled with attempted tenderness, ultimately prevents the victim from
leaving her abuser.
The perception of powerlessness to escape the violence is rein-
forced by social stereotypes: premiums are placed on the appearance
of a happy family'8 9 and women are often counseled to keep the fam-
ily together at any cost.' 90 Women who want to leave their abusive
mates may lack the financial resources to do so.191 The batterer's su-
perior physical strength may add to a woman's perception of him as
all-powerful.192 Dr. Walker asserts that "[c]ultural conditions, mar-
riage laws, economic realities, physical inferiority-all these teach wo-
men that they have no direct control over the circumstances of their
lives."'193 Thus, when victims of domestic violence endure unpro-
voked, repetitious violence, coupled with social pressures and expec-
tations, severe emotional and motivational deficits result; and, the
abuse continues.
c. Reversing Learned Helplessness in Battered Women
If a woman falls victim to learned helplessness, can the cycle of vio-
lence be stopped and learned helplessness be reversed? Dr. Walker
claims it can. 194 She states that "[a] first step would seem to be to
stress disorder,] if a person believes [he or she does] not have control over a
situation, he [or she] will be more likely to respond with coping responses
rather than by trying to escape. As applied to a battered woman, she does
not attempt to leave because she cannot predict her own safety; she believes
that nothing can be done, by her or by anyone else, which will change her
situation. A battered woman is unable to predict the consequences of her
actions, because there is no relationship between her conduct and the fre-
quency of abuse inflicted on her. It is this "learned helplessness" [that] pre-
vents a battered woman from leaving the battering relationship, even though
it may appear to outsiders that the battered woman could do so safely.
Scott G. Baker, Note, Deaf Justice?: Battered Women Unjustly Imprisoned Prior to
the Enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107, 24 Golden Gate U. L Rev. 99, 103-04
n.20 (1993) (citing Lenore E. Walker, Terrifying Love 48-51 (1989)).
189. See Dowd, supra note 70, at 569 (discussing traditional female stereotypes and
how they help perpetuate violence against women).
190. See supra note 171 (citing Del Martin's research findings).
191. See The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 52. See generally Robert H. Cohen,
Pay-Equity: A Child of the 80s Grows Up, 63 Fordham L Rev. 1461 (1995) (discuss-
ing wage disparities between men and women).
192. The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 52.
193. Id. As Dr. Walker asserts:
Although [women] are not subjected to electrical shocks as the dogs in the
experiments were, they are subjected to both parental and institutional con-
ditioning that restricts their alternatives and shelters them from the conse-
quences of any disapproved alternatives. Perhaps battered women, like the
dogs who learn that their behavior is unrelated to their subsequent welfare,
have lost their ability to respond effectively.
Id.
194. See id. at 53-54. Carrying forward the analogy to Dr. Seligman's original re-
search, Dr. Walker states:
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persuade the battered woman to leave the battering relationship or
persuade the batterer to leave."'195 Second, the woman needs to be
counseled to learn that she is capable of controlling her own life.19 6
Dr. Walker asserts that, "[w]omen must be able to believe that their
behavior will affect what happens to them. Counseling or psychother-
apy can teach women to control their own lives and to be able to erase
that kind of victim potential."'" Unfortunately, many women never
find the power to escape the violent relationship, and those who do
often resort to deadly violence-finding themselves embroiled in a
legal battle and fighting to explain their behavior as reasonable in
light of the abuse they endure. 98
III. Ti USE OF THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME IN COURTS
In the last decade, the psychological proffle known as the battered
woman syndrome has found its way into the nation's courtrooms. 99
Presently, all fifty states have allowed battered woman syndrome evi-
dence to be admitted in court,2°° and many states have specific eviden-
tiary rules to cover the admissibility of expert testimony on the
battered woman syndrome.20 1 This part explores the various ways
Turning back to the animal studies, we see that the dogs could only be taught
to overcome their passivity by being dragged repeatedly out of the punishing
situation and shown how to avoid the shock. Just as the dogs have helped us
understand why battered women do not leave their violent situations volun-
tarily, perhaps they can also suggest ways the women can reverse being
battered.
Id. at 53.
Dr. Seligman's more recent work illustrates a link between an attitude of optimism
and the avoidance of symptoms of learned helplessness. He postulates that when
someone remains optimistic she can ultimately reverse or even inoculate herself
against the development of learned helplessness. See generally Martin E.P. Seligman,
Learned Optimism (1990) (asserting that learned helplessness is reversible).
195. The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 53.
196. Id. at 54.
197. Id. Dr. Walker points to the vital importance of gaining self esteem and feel-
ings of competence in women if they are to overcome learned helplessness. Id.
198. See infra part III.A (discussing a battered woman's reliance on the battered
woman syndrome when she is on trial for murder and claims self-defense).
199. The first case to admit expert testimony on battered woman syndrome was
Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 630-31 (D.C. 1979), affid, 455 A.2d 893(D.C. 1983). Although remanded, the case remained influential in other jurisdictions.
200. For examples of cases where courts have admitted evidence regarding the bat-
tered woman syndrome, see infra note 208. Courts have admitted such evidence
under different bases, including statutory mandate, constitutional reasons, and case
law.
201. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 1107 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995). According to Cali-
fornia law:
In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible by either the prosecution
or the defense regarding battered women's syndrome, including the physical,
emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of
victims of domestic violence, except when offered against a criminal defend-
ant to prove the occurrence of the act or acts of abuse which form the basis
of the criminal charge.
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that battered woman syndrome evidence has been relied upon in legal
disputes.202 Most frequently, battered woman syndrome evidence is
introduced by a battered woman who is on trial for killing her abuser
and who is asserting a claim of self-defense. She relies on such evi-
dence to elucidate her mental state prior to the homicide. Recently,
battered woman syndrome evidence has also been used in various
other contexts by victims of domestic violence. As described in this
part, however, such evidence can at times undermine a battered wo-
man's particular claim. This part concludes with a discussion and fac-
tual illustration of how defendant-batterers have begun to rely on
battered woman syndrome evidence to bolster their claims of inno-
cence in trials for the abuse or murder of their wives.
A. Reliance on Battered Woman Syndrome by
Victims of Domestic Violence
State criminal justice systems allow parties to admit expert testi-
mony on the battered woman syndrome in numerous contexts. Most
often, battered woman syndrome evidence is introduced in the con-
text of a murder trial where the defendant claims she was a battered
woman and acted in self-defense 0 3 when she killed her batterer'
Procedurally, evidence regarding the battered woman syndrome is in-
troduced through the testimony of an expert witness. 205 The battered
Id; see also Ohio. Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.06 (Baldwin 1990) (recognizing that the
battered woman syndrome is "currently a matter of commonly accepted scientific
knowledge" and is not within the general understanding of the public, thus, it is ad-
missible in the form of expert testimony "as evidence to establish the requisite belief
of an imminent danger" when a defendant has plead self-defense); Md. Code Ann.,
Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-916 (1995) (allowing evidence of the battered woman syn-
drome, otherwise referred to as the battered spouse syndrome, "for the purpose of
explaining the defendant's motive or state of mind, or both, at the time of the com-
mission of the alleged offense"); Wyo. Stat. § 6-1-203 (1993 & Supp. 1995) (permitting
the introduction of evidence that the defendant was suffering from the battered wo-
man syndrome "to establish the necessary requisite belief of an imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm as an element of the affirmative defense, to justify the
person's use of force").
202. A discussion of the complex evidentiary issues involved in admitting expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome is beyond the scope of this Note. For a
detailed analysis of such issues see Schroeder, supra note 186; see also Scott G. Baker,
Note, Deaf Justice?: Battered Women Unjustly Imprisoned Prior to the Enactment of
Evidence Code Section 1107,24 Golden Gate U.L Rev. 99 (1994); Margaret M. Pren-
dergast, Evidence-The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battered Woman Syn-
drome Under the Federal Rules of Evidence-Arcoren v. United States 929 F.2d 1235
(8th Cir.), cerL denied, 112 S.CL 312 (1991), 65 Temp. L. Rev. 341 (1992).
203. Generally, a claim of self-defense requires that the defendant establish that
her conduct was subjectively reasonable. See supra note 19 (discussing the standard
for the justification of self-defense).
204. See generally Walker, Syndrome and Self-Defense, supra note 8 (discussing the
use of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome m conjunction with a wo-
man's claim of self-defense).
205. Id. at 321. In the context of a criminal trial, the battered woman syndrome is
not used as "character evidence." Rather, it is offered through expert testimony to
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woman introduces such evidence in order to assist the trier of fact in
determining whether, as a victim of cyclical abuse, the defendant acted
out of a reasonable belief that she was in imminent danger of death or
grave bodily harm.20 6 At least one court has required the admission
of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in order to en-
sure that the battered woman received her constitutional right to a fair
trial.20 7 The recent trend is to admit expert testimony regarding the
battered woman syndrome because it is helpful to the jury so that they
can better comprehend the lives of battered women20 8 and it is not
help the trier of fact understand the state of mind of the battered woman. Character
evidence is inadmissible in most contexts if used to show that a defendant likely acted
in conformity with a certain character trait. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) ("Evidence
of a person's character . . . is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion . . . ."). There is an exception to the
general rule that character evidence is inadmissible to show propensity to act a certain
way in a criminal trial. The exception is sometimes referred to as the "Rule of Mercy"
and gives a criminal defendant the opportunity to introduce evidence of good charac-
ter traits inconsistent with the charged conduct, as long as those traits are probative.
If the defendant chooses to avail himself of the Rule of Mercy, the prosecution is
permitted to rebut such evidence with negative character traits. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid.
404(a)(1) (prohibiting the introduction of character evidence except "Evidence of a
pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same").
Battered woman syndrome evidence does not provide evidence of the character of
a woman, rather it shows psychological effects of domestic abuse. Evidence of prior
acts of abuse, similarly do not violate the prohibition of character evidence so long as
they are introduced for a limited purpose and are not used to infer that the defendant-
batterer acted in conformity with those prior acts by committing the charged act. As
the Federal Rules of Evidence illustrate:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident ....
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
206. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375 (N.J. 1984) (allowing expert testi-
mony on battered woman syndrome to bolster a defendant's testimony); State v.
Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981) (stating that expert testimony might explain the
defendant's perceptions and behavior at the time of the killing).
207. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 781 (Pa. 1989) (ruling
that testimony on the battered woman syndrome is vital to a battered woman's claim
of self-defense and, therefore, trial counsel was ineffective by not proffering evidence
on the theory).
208. See, e.g., People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1189 (Ct. App. 1989) (admit-
ting evidence of battered woman syndrome to establish the defendant's state of mind
regarding her perception of danger, imminence, and force necessary to protect her-
self); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 632 (D.C. 1979), aftd, 455 A.2d 893,
894 (D.C. 1983) (stating that the admission of battered woman syndrome is within a
trial judge's discretion and not, per se, admissible as a matter of law); Terry v. State,
467 So. 2d 761, 763-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing evidence of battered wo-
man syndrome to support defendant's claim of self-defense); Smith v. State, 277
S.E.2d 678, 683 (Ga. 1981) (permitting testimony regarding battered woman syn-
drome to prove self-defense); People v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209, 217-18 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983) (allowing evidence of battered woman syndrome to assist the jury in under-
standing why the defendant dismembered the victim's body); State v. Hundley, 693
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prejudicial.2 "9 Once treated with hostility and skepticism,210 the bat-
P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1985) (admitting evidence of battered woman syndrome to prove
the nature and effect of wife beating on the mental state of the defendant); State v.
Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981) (admitting testimony regarding battered woman
syndrome to explain a defendant's "perceptions and behavior at the time of the kill-
ing"); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793,798 (Minn. 1989) (allowing expert testimony
regarding battered woman syndrome because the syndrome is not within the under-
standing of an ordinary lay person); May v. State, 460 So. 2d 778, 785 (Miss. 1984)
(holding that evidence of battered woman syndrome is admissible because it has im-
portant informational and explanatory power which must be accommodated by the
law); State v. Baker, 424 A-2d 171, 173 (N.H. 1980) (holding battered woman syn-
drome testimony admissible when the husband is the defendant charged with at-
tempted murder of his wife); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375-77 (NJ. 1984) (finding
testimony of battered woman syndrome relevant to honesty and reasonableness of the
defendant's belief, to explain her state of mind, and to bolster her self-defense claim);
State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268,1274 (N.M. CL App. 1986) (affirming admissibility of
battered woman syndrome testimony and recognizing the general acceptance of bat-
tered woman syndrome in the field of psychology); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S .d
358, 362 (Crim. Ct. 1985) (admitting testimony of battered woman syndrome to
counter the jury's common sense conclusion that a reasonable person would have left
the abusive relationship); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811,819-20 (N.D. 1983) (ad-
mitting evidence of battered woman syndrome to support a self-defense claim, not as
a separate defense in itself); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974-75 (Ohio 1990) (stating
that when evidence establishes the defendant as a battered woman, and when an ex-
pert is qualified to testify regarding battered woman syndrome, expert testimony con-
cerning battered woman syndrome is admissible to "assist the trier of fact in
determining whether the defendant acted out of an honest belief that she was in im-
minent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the use of such force was her
only means of escape"); State v. Furlough, 797 S.W.2d 631, 651 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1990) (allowing testimony on battered woman syndrome to establish "the defendant's
perception of fear and imminence of danger at the time [she] killed her husband");
Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309, 319-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (stating that the pros-
ecutor must imply that the defendant was not fearful at the time of the incident before
expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome will be admissible to help es-
tablish a defendant's fear or apprehension of danger at the time of the killing); State
v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165, 1173 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (allowing testimony regarding
battered woman syndrome to explain a delay in reporting abuse and the failure to
leave an abusive environment); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (Wash. 1984) (en
banc) (admitting evidence of battered woman syndrome to explain the defendant's
perception of threat and the reasonableness of the force employed in self-defense);
State v. Steele, 359 S.E.2d 558, 564-65 (NV. Va. 1987) (admitting testimony regarding
battered woman syndrome to explain the psychological basis for the syndrome and to
show that the defendant fit the syndrome); State v. Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161, 170 (Wis.
1983) (holding that trial counsel was ineffective because instead of utilizing battered
woman syndrome to aid in a heat-of-passion manslaughter defense, he relied solely on
a traditional self-defense argument).
209. According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, and mirrored in most state rules
of evidence, relevant evidence will not be admitted if, infer alia, "its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury.. . ." Fed. R. Evid. 403. The California Evidence Code has a
similar standard for admission of relevant evidence. According to the state rule:
"The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consump-
tion of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury." Cal. Evid. Code § 352 (West 1966).
210. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text (discussing the problems bat-
tered woman had before courts admitted evidence on the battered woman syndrome).
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tered woman syndrome now is viewed as highly probative in deter-
mining whether a battered woman's conduct is consistent with her
claim of self-defense.21'
Battered woman syndrome evidence has been introduced by victims
of domestic violence in other contexts as well. In each of the follow-
ing examples, expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome is
relevant because it helps to explain the state of mind of the battered
woman defendant. Some jurisdictions have allowed testimony about
the battered woman syndrome in parole hearings and in pleas for
clemency.212 The basis for allowing such evidence is that the battered
woman defendant was not permitted to rely on expert testimony re-
garding the battered woman syndrome at her original trial and is sub-
sequently afforded the opportunity to explain her behavior in the
context of the syndrome.21 3 Battered women have relied on the bat-
tered woman syndrome to explain their involvement by coercion with
a violent co-defendant in homicides or other crimes against stran-
gers.214 In that scenario, the woman may argue that she was powerless
to refuse her batterer's demand that she participate in the crime.21 5
Charged with child abuse or "murder by omission" because of her
inability to protect her child from her husband, a woman in an abusive
relationship may attempt to rely on evidence of the battered woman
syndrome to explain her inaction.21 6 Such testimony can help explain
why she was unable to act rationally and prevent the abuse of her
children by her batterer.217
Women have also attempted to use evidence that they have been
battered in custody disputes, arguing that the batterer-father does not
deserve custody in light of his abusive behavior toward the mother of
211. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375-77 (N.J. 1984) (finding testimony of bat-
tered woman syndrome relevant to defendant's claim of self-defense); Murphy, supra
note 129, at 292-300 (discussing how battered woman syndrome evidence helps the
jury understand a victim's state of mind).
212. See Mary E. Greenwald & Mary-Ellen Manning, When Mercy Seasons Justice:
Commutation for Battered Women Who Kill, Boston B.J., MarJApr. 1994, at 3-4 (out-
lining and discussing Massachusetts Governor Weld's amendment to the commutation
guidelines).
213. Id. at 12.
214. Walker, Syndrome and Self-Defense, supra note 8, at 322. "Crimes involving
money and property such as embezzlement, forgery, burglary, robbery and those that
are drug related may well have been committed by a woman at the demand of her
batterer." Id.
215. See id.
216. Id. But see infra text accompanying parts III.B, III.C (discussing the improper
use of the battered woman syndrome).
217. See, e.g., In the Matter of Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464, 469 (Fam. Ct. 1992)
(describing how the mother of a child who had been sexually abused by his father
relied on expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in her trial for child
abuse to explain that according to the syndrome, battering causes "a breaking down
of a woman's self confidence and self respect to a point where she no longer knows if
she is crazy or not" (quoting expert witness in the case)).
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the children.21 Currently, one victim of domestic violence is relying
on the battered woman syndrome to persuade a court to toll the stat-
ute of limitations to bring a civil suit against her batterer 19 In such
context, the battered woman is relying on the theory to explain her
state of mind during and immediately after the years of abuse, and
why she was, therefore, incapable of filing a timely civil claim.
Even though each of the above scenarios involves different specific
legal issues, battered women have relied on battered woman syn-
drome evidence to substantiate their distinct claims by providing a
psychological context to examine their behavior. As Dr. Walker
explains,
The common thread between these seemingly disparate cases is
testimony about the psychological knowledge concerning the dy-
namics of an abusive relationship and its psychological impact on
the woman's state of mind to help meet the legal standard of self-
defense or duress which might not be otherwise met if the history of
abuse was not known? 2°
In each of the above instances where battered woman syndrome evi-
dence has been proffered, the victim's state of mind is at issue, thus
forming a common thread that justifies reliance on the theory. 22'
B. Evidence of Battered Woman Syndrome Often Hinders a
Victim's Claim
As a result of the broader acceptance of expert testimony on the
battered woman syndrome in the legal arena, such evidence has in-
creasingly been admitted in various contexts, sometimes in ways that
misapply the syndrome and betray the experiences of battered wo-
men. Furthermore, evidence regarding the battered woman syndrome
does not consistently benefit a victim of domestic violence. Often, a
218. See Eleanor B. Alter, Custody, Visitation, and Domestic Violence: Law, Prac-
tice, and Procedure in New York 3 (Family Law Unit, Brooklyn Legal Services Corp.
B., Nov. 5, 1994) (discussing domestic violence as a factor in child custody disputes)
(on file with the Fordham Law Review); see also Marjory D. Fields, The Impact of
Spouse Abuse on Children and its Relevance in Custody and Visitation Decisions in
New York State, 3 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 221 (1994) (surveying the substantial body
of scientific research relevant to the effects of wife abuse on children and cataloging
how New York courts have addressed the issue); Gary Spencer, Child Abuse Linked
to Battered Women, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 3, 1988, at 2 (discussing a report by the Special
Committee on Women in the Courts and their recommendation "that when there are
children in the home of a battered spouse or live-in partner, police should make 'a
further investigation of their circumstances"').
219. See Memorandum of Law Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff at 15-25, Nuss-
baum v. Steinberg, (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (No. 23416/88) (not yet submitted, on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
220. Walker, Syndrome and Self-Defense, supra note 8, at 323 (discussing in a Jour-
nal on Ethics and Public Policy the various uses of the battered woman syndrome in
courtrooms).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 212-17, 219.
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battered woman does not view herself as a passive victim, nor does
she want to present herself as such to the court.222 Nonetheless, be-
cause the battered woman syndrome is the most often judicially recog-
nized theory on the psychological impact of domestic abuse, many
women find themselves relying on a theory that does not significantly
further their particular case.
As a result, women have lost custody of their children because of
the claim that they suffer from learned helplessness according to the
battered woman syndrome z 3 The opposing counsel argues that be-
cause a woman is helpless in the context of her relationship with her
husband, she must, therefore, not be a good parent and it would not
be in the best interest of her children to remain in her custody. The
court reasons that if a woman is helpless to assure her own safety, she
must be similarly incapable of assuring the safety of her children. 2 4
As one commentator noted:
In recent years, expert witnesses on battered-woman syndrome
have shown up in divorce and child-custody cases ... testifying for
the battering dad. They "diagnose" the syndrome in the battered
222. See Jones, supra note 7, at 15A (asserting that "battered women today usually
don't think of themselves as helpless victims").
223. See Ann Jones, Children of a Lesser Mom: Women Who Fail to Save their Kids
from Abusive Men may be Guilty of Neglect. But the Courts are Calling it Murder,
Lear's, May 1993, at 30, 32 (discussing cases where women have been held criminally
liable for the death of their children at the hands of an abusive husband and arguing
that the battered woman syndrome does not bolster the women's claims).
224. Id. at 32. Condemning the courts for the way they treat battered women-in
part, blaming the broad reliance on the battered woman syndrome, Ann Jones states:
Many years ago, feminist psychologists introduced the battered-woman's
syndrome to explain to juries the helpless state of mind of a battered woman
who sees no way out but to kill the man who batters her. Now the state uses
expert witnesses on battered-woman's syndrome to testify against the bat-
tered women, arguing that the syndrome makes them helpless, dependent,
and unfit mothers. Blamed for being battered, charged with crimes the bat-
terer committed, women lose their children because of their "malady."
Id.
Some courts have relied on the battered woman syndrome when declining to con-
vict a "passive" mother for the abuse of her children. The syndrome evidence, how-
ever, does not provide the mother with a complete justification for her seeming
inability to protect her children. As one New York court noted:
This court is in accord with those who have recognized that Battered Wo-
man's Syndrome is a condition which seriously impairs the will and the judg-
ment of the victim. The abused should not be branded as abuser.
Respondent mother in the case at bar clearly did not condone the sexual
abuse of the children by the respondent father, but rather, due to her afflic-
tion with Battered Woman's Syndrome, was powerless to stop it. She cannot
be said to have "allowed" the abuse within the meaning of Family Court Act
§ 1012 (e) (iii). Accordingly, the child abuse charges against the respondent
mother herein are dismissed. The neglect statute, however, imposes strict
liability. As respondent mother's actions were manifestly inadequate to pro-
tect the children from the father's ongoing abuse, of which she was well
aware, a finding of neglect must be entered against her.
Matter of Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464, 470 (Fam. Ct. 1992) (emphasis added).
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mother. The court labels her unfit. And the kids go to the batterer,
who is seen (despite his "temper") as another regular guy victimized
by what [O.J. Simpson's defense attorney Johnnie] Cochran likes to
call "a rocky marriage." -
Such reasoning is not founded in the research supporting the battered
woman syndrome ms and represents an imprecise use of the theory by
drawing an inference that is not necessarily logical. The fact that a
woman is helpless as a result of the particular dynamics of her abusive
relationship does not indicate that she is an unfit parent or helpless in
other aspects of her life.
An inherent obstacle to universal reliance on Dr. Walker's three-
stage normative model arises when the pattern of domestic violence in
a given situation does not mirror her categorical explanation. Specifi-
cally, in cases traditionally associated with the use of battered woman
syndrome evidence-when a battered woman uses the theory to bol-
ster her claim of self-defense-prosecutors may attempt to impeach
an expert's testimony by claiming that an individual relationship does
not trace the predictions of the battered woman syndrome. 227 In such
cases, a victim of domestic violence who is now on trial as a criminal
defendant is confronted with evidence that the violence immediately
preceding the homicide was no different than any other episode of
violence between the parties. The woman who has fought back and
killed her batterer is challenged to articulate what was unique or dif-
ferent about the final cycle of abuse that caused her to use deadly
force against her batterer. Often, she is unable to do so, and her self-
defense claim is undermined.2 8
The fact that a woman may not appear passive and helpless, that the
specific pattern of abuse in a given case did not follow the three dis-
tinct phases, or that the batterer did not exhibit behavior consistent
with a cycle of violence, should not be dispositive of whether she was
seriously abused.22 9 The battered woman syndrome does not purport
225. Jones, supra note 7, at 15A.
226. See infra part IV (discussing the illogical and improper use of the battered
woman syndrome to provide evidence about a batterer).
227. See supra notes 26-27, 29-32 and accompanying text.
228. The prosecutor's logic is as follows: if there is a cycle of violence and the
defendant has been through repetitions of that cycle without believing she would die,
why was it reasonable for her to perceive an imminent threat of death during this
particular cycle of violence?
229. It is on this basis that Dr. Walker was planning to testify on behalf of O.J.
Simpson. In his opening statements to the jury in the O.J. Simpson trial, defense
attorney Johnnie Cochran Jr. asserted-
[W]hen [defense witness Lenore] Walker comes and testifies to you, she will
talk about the fact that life-threatening violence usually precedes a homicide
incident and she does not find that in this case .... The level of violence in
this case and the pattern is atypical... of those relationships where a lethal
incident often occurs.
Rush to Judgment, supra note 38, at A14 (transcribing portions of Cochran's opening
statement).
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to describe every battered woman or every battering relationship. In
fact, only two-thirds of the women Dr. Walker interviewed for her
original research described relationships that followed the three-phase
cycle of violence. 30
Challenging a battered woman's case because her character does
not mirror the symptoms outlined in the battered woman syndrome is
inappropriate. The battered woman syndrome is not a diagnostic
tool.23 ' Research concerning the battered woman syndrome stems
from the underlying assumption that battering has already oc-
curred. 32 From such premise, Dr. Walker developed the syndrome to
explain victims' behavior.2 33 The battered woman syndrome does not
detect whether battering has occurred, and should not be used for that
purpose in court. For purposes of psychological treatment it does not
matter whether a woman was in fact battered or the precise extent of
the abuse, but in a criminal context such a determination is crucial.
Courts must be clear that expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome is helpful to explain behavior, but does not displace objec-
tive evidence of abuse.2 4
Despite the above criticism and apparent shortcomings of the use
and misapplication of Dr. Walker's theory, the battered woman syn-
drome is the only judicially recognized theory regarding the psycho-
logical impact of prolonged spousal abuse to date. As such, a battered
woman who wants to introduce expert testimony that specifically
targets her unique situation, and explains shared symptoms among
battered women as a group, must rely on the battered woman syn-
drome and attempt to show that she exhibits symptoms consistent
with the theory. 35
230. See supra note 138.
231. A diagnostic tool would be used to diagnose a victim; that is, to help detect
when abuse has occurred. The battered woman syndrome, however, was not devel-
oped as a diagnostic aid. Rather, the theory underlying the battered woman syn-
drome was developed to explain the behavior of women known to have been
battered. See generally The Battered Woman, supra note 7 (describing the cycle of
violence in abusive relationships); The Battered Woman Syndrome, supra note 8
(same); Schroeder, supra note 186, at 575 ("An opinion that the victim suffers from
the battered woman syndrome should be inadmissible because the syndrome was not
developed as a diagnostic tool."); see also Boxall, supra note 11, at Al, A31 ("Re-
duced to its essence, battered woman syndrome is not a physician's diagnosis but an
advocate's invention. It means: Blame the deceased." (quoting the dean of Mc-
George Law School discussing the battered woman syndrome)).
232. See The Battered Woman Syndrome, supra note 8, at ix-xi (developing theo-
ries about the battered woman syndrome by drawing conclusions from known cases of
battering).
233. See id.
234. See supra note 209 (discussing the limited admissibility of evidence regarding
incidents of prior bad acts according to the Federal Rules of Evidence).
235. See infra part IV.B (describing an alternative theory regarding why battered
women often act in certain distinct ways).
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C. Defendant-Batterers' Use of Battered Woman Syndrome
Evidence to Bolster Their Claims of Innocence
The most distorted application of battered woman syndrome evi-
dence occurs when the batterer himself tries to use it in his own de-
fense.2 6 This is precisely how O.J. Simpson's defense team had
planned to use Dr. Walker's testimony; to bolster his defense by as-
serting that his relationship with his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson,
at the time of her death, did not fit within the confines of the battered
woman syndromeP37 In other words, O.J. Simpson does not fit the
profile, according to the leading expert on the battered woman syn-
drome, of a batterer who would kill his wife.3 s
The research relied upon in the development of the battered wo-
man syndrome, however, did not involve specific determinations
about what sort of batterer would likely kill his victim.339 Relying on
the theory to bolster a claim that the defendant-batterer is innocent
based on findings about the psychological state of a battered woman
invites the jury to ignore other factual evidence presented at trial.
Nonetheless, prior to being dropped from the defense's wvitness list,
Dr. Walker indicated that her testimony would involve her determina-
tion that O.J. Simpson does not have an anti-social personality disor-
der, whereas people who commit homicide usually do. 40
In a sense, the prosecution in the Simpson case created an opening
for the defense to make the above argument by attempting to portray
the homicide in the framework of an abusive relationship without us-
ing expert testimony to place prior acts of abuse in a proper psycho-
logical context.24' Without expert testimony, jurors are left to
consider the prior acts of abuse in the context of the usual myths
about abusive relationships.242 The prosecution proffered evidence of
specific instances of the defendant's prior abuse of Nicole Brown
Simpson. The prosecution, however, failed to support its theory with
expert testimony to explain that the battered woman syndrome is a
236. This Note does not argue, however, that men accused of battering should not
be able to use battered woman syndrome evidence at trial. Rather, this Note advo-
cates for the proper and limited use of the theory by all parties.
237. See supra notes 30-31, 38-40 and accompanying text.
238. See supra text accompanying note 38.
239. See supra note 138 (describing Dr. Walker's research when developing the the-
ory of the battered woman syndrome).
240. McCarthy, supra note 5, at A4, A22.
241. See Larry Reibstein, And Now the Trial, Newsweek, Jan. 23, 1995, at 44
(chronicling the alleged incidents of the prior abuse of Nicole Brown Simpson by OJ.
Simpson and discussing the forthcoming operng statements). See generally People v.
Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 36094 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 1995) (official tran-
script of opening statement by Ms. Clark) (setting forth the witnesses who will testify
about prior abuse, but not discussing any plan to rely on an expert witness on the
battered woman syndrome).
242. See supra part II.A.
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therapeutic analysis, not a prognosis with inevitable and necessary
symptoms.
The Simpson case provides a classic example of the potential for
misuse of the battered woman syndrome in the context of the prosecu-
tion of a batterer for the murder or assault of his mate.243 While the
prosecutor in such a case may rely on evidence of previous assaults
and an ongoing battering relationship in order to prove motive, intent
or identity,2" and perhaps to clarify the actions of the victim as typical
of many battered women, such evidence does not always benefit the
prosecutor's case. If the facts of a given case are arguably inconsistent
with the cycle of violence or the theory of learned helplessness, de-
fendant-batterers may attempt to use evidence of the battered woman
syndrome to undermine the prosecution's evidence of prior abuse.
In the above context, the defense might attempt to minimize the
evidence of specific incidents of abuse by offering expert testimony
about general characteristics often observed in an abusive relationship
but arguably absent in the specific case. Such attempt shifts the focus
away from factual accounts of battering incidents to viewing the bat-
tered woman syndrome as a predictor. Such an argument, however,
relies on inverted logic and is an improper use of the battered woman
syndrome. Extrapolating from evidence relating to the state of mind
of a victim to determine the actions of a defendant-batterer is illogical
and irrelevant.245
Dr. Walker's proposed premise for concluding that O.J. Simpson
does not exhibit traits of a batterer who would cross the line to homi-
cide also moves dangerously into the realm of providing opinion testi-
mony on the ultimate issue 246 of whether a defendant-batterer is a
killer.247 In the end, the jury must decide the defendant-batterer's cul-
pability according to all the evidence it has heard.
Furthermore, in the past, when Dr. Walker has discussed men who
batter, she has done so without targeting them as suffering from a
243. For an insightful opinion regarding when battered woman syndrome evidence
should be admissible in this context, see Schroeder, supra note 186, at 553.
244. See supra note 205 (discussing the limited grounds and procedure for intro-
ducing character evidence).
245. See infra part IV.A.
246. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing the proper use of
expert testimony).
247. Many battered women's advocates responded to Dr. Walker's determination
that OJ. Simpson does not have an antisocial personality disorder by emphasizing
that such a determination is wholly irrelevant. As one critic of Dr. Walker's pur-
ported determinations about Simpson stressed: "So what?... Most of the men who
batter or kill don't have antisocial personality disorder." Bass, supra note 29, at 8; see
also McCarthy, supra note 5, at A22. ("I don't know of any research that says that. I
don't know what her research is based on." (quoting the director of a treatment pro-
gram for batterers)).
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psychological disorder.2as Rather, Dr. Walker outlined the profile of a
batterer as portrayed by his victim as follows: (1) low self-esteem; (2)
adheres to all the myths about battering relationships; (3) is a tradi-
tionalist, believing in male supremacy and the stereotyped masculine
sex role in the family; (4) blames others for his actions; (5) pathologi-
cally jealous; (6) presents a dual personality; (7) has severe stress reac-
tions, during which he uses drinking and wife battering to cope; (8)
frequently uses sex as an act of aggression to enhance self-esteem in
view of waning virility-may be bisexual; (9) does not believe his vio-
lent behavior should have negative consequences.2 9 The fact that Dr.
Walker has asked battered women to discuss character traits of their
batterers does not indicate that she is a qualified expert on men who
batter.25 0
Although Dr. Walker will no longer testify in the Simpson case, the
notion of having an expert on battered women testify for a defendant-
batterer in response to a prosecutor's introduction of specific incidents
of battering involving the victim and the defendant requires that
courts take a careful look at the basis for admitting such testimony.
Courts should reject as irrelevant a defendant's argument that he
should not be found guilty if the particular relationship's abuse pat-
tern does not fall squarely within the bounds of the battered woman
syndrome.2 1
Courts should reject the use of the battered woman syndrome
where, as above, the victim's state of mind is not at issue and where an
expert, who arguably is not an expert on men who batter, nonetheless
attempts to use the battered woman syndrome to render an opinion
on the actions of a particular defendant-batterer.251 Courts must be
prepared to assess adequately those situations where a defendant-bat-
terer is on trial for assault or murder of his victim, and the defense
tries to use the battered woman syndrome as a tool.
D. Case Study: A Defendant-Batterer's Reliance on a Battered
Woman Syndrome Expert
Another concern facing the courts when a defendant-batterer at-
tempts to rely on expert testimony regarding the battered woman syn-
drome is the relative weight that will be afforded to an expert's
testimony. Even before the Simpson case, Dr. Walker testified as an
expert on the battered woman syndrome on behalf of a defendant-
batterer on trial for murder. Critics of Dr. Walker argue that because
248. See generally discussion infra part IV.C (calling for further research on men
who batter).
249. The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 36; see also Pagelow, supra note 109, at
89-108 (describing typical character traits of both victims and abusers).
250. See discussion infra part IV.A.2.
251. See infra notes 311-12 and accompanying text (discussing characteristics of
batterers).
252. See infra part IV.A.
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Dr. Walker is known for her pioneering work as an advocate for bat-
tered women, jurors are likely to be significantly influenced by her
impressive credentials when she testifies as an expert for a batterer 5 3
Such criticism of Dr. Walker's participation in a trial as an expert for
an accused batterer highlights the danger of allowing improper reli-
ance on expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome.
Recently, Dr. Walker testified as an expert for George Samuel
Wade at his Fort Lauderdale trial for the murder of his ex-lover, Su-
zanne Emerick. Dr. Walker's testimony included a statement that she
believed the defendant-batterer254 was insane?255 After the jurors de-
clined to convict the defendant of first degree murder, instead convict-
ing him of the lesser charge of manslaughter, Wade's attorney was
quoted as saying: "There's no question the jury loved [Dr. Walker],
because I spoke to the jurors after the trial.... She was a star in every
respect. 256
The Florida media closely followed the Wade trial, recounting de-
tails of both the murder and the impact of Dr. Walker's presence as an
expert witness for the defendant-batterer:
In September 1992 ... Wade . .. choked Emerick to death,
shoved her limp body into a Toyota, strapped her in with a seat belt,
put sunglasses on her face and drove around looking for a place to
set her body afire, police say. The couple's 16-month-old daughter,
Rachel, was in the back seat.
After Walker spent two days on the stand in Wade's defense, ju-
rors on Jan. 27, 1994 convicted Wade of manslaughter. He had been
charged with first degree murder.
"After a day in that courtroom with Lenore Walker, we just sat
there and cried," said the victim's father.257
It seemed bitterly ironic to the victim's family that Dr. Walker, an
advocate for battered women, would testify on behalf of their daugh-
ter's killer.
Wade had confessed to the police, saying that after an argument
over visitation with the couple's daughter, "I had enough of her and I
decided to kill her .... I put my hands around her throat and choked
her until she was dead." 58 When Wade was examined by experts
before trial, however, he gave a different account of what had tran-
253. See supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text (outlining Dr. Walker's accom-
plishments as an advocate for battered women).
254. Greene, supra note 28, at 5A ("Two years before the killing, Wade had re-
vealed earlier abuse in his diary, 'I've put her through more hell, pain and total humil-
iation than anyone can imagine and still she stays .... Just yesterday, I almost choked
her to death."').
255. Id. (quoting the victim's mother as recoiling in disgust when she heard Dr.
Walker testify that the defendant was insane).
256. Id. (quoting Wade's defense attorney).
257. Id.
258. Id. (quoting the defendant's confession).
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spired on the night Emerick died. He insisted that Emerick was
swinging her arms violently during an argument and he merely lunged
out and caught her by the neck, telling her to stop it and not knowing
that she was dead until, after 10 or 15 seconds, her arms went limp.2 9
He said he put her in the car in order to drive her to the hospital, but
he couldn't find the hospital.2' Dr. Walker apparently believed this
version of events. She explained her opinion of the facts of the case26t
to reporters after the trial: "It's very clear that he didn't believe she
was dead. And he believed he was taking her to the hospital .... I
think [the killing] was an accident, or at the most I think it was man-
slaughter .... This was an argument they were having.... She was
not savagely killed."'262
Advocates for battered women who followed the murder trial are
convinced that Dr. Walker's testimony had a strong impact on the ver-
dict in the case.263 "Many believe Walker's testimony was the key to
winning Wade leniency." 64 Wade is tentatively scheduled to be re-
leased from prison in April of 2000.215 Poignantly, just one year
before her death, Susan Emerick had borrowed Dr. Walker's book,
The Battered Woman Syndrome, from the library where her mother
worked.26
IV. CouRTs MUST GuARD AGAINST THE IMPROPER USE
OF THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME IN
THE PROSECUTION OF A BATTERER
Courts must reject on relevancy grounds the introduction of bat-
tered woman syndrome evidence where the dispositive issues at a par-
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. As discussed earlier, expert witnesses are not allowed to give opinions as to
the state of mind of a criminal defendant. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying
text.
262. Greene, supra note 28, at 5A (alteration in original) (quoting Dr. Walker).
263. While the above account does not include details of Dr. Walker's precise testi-
mony at trial, it highlights the undue impact an expert on the battered woman syn-
drome can have when testifying on behalf of a defendant-batterer. As explained
above, this Note does not advocate that a defendant-batterer should not have access
to expert witnesses. Nor does it state that Dr. Walker, or any expert on the battered
woman syndrome, should never testify on behalf of a defendant-batterer. Rather, this
Note questions the proper and relevant use of battered woman syndrome evidence,
particularly when the defendant-batterer's state of mind is at issue in a particular trial,
not the victim's. See discussion infra part IV.A.1. Furthermore, this Note challenges
the qualifications of an expert on the battered woman syndrome testifying to facts
regarding men who batter, an area arguably outside his or her realm of expertise. See
discussion infra part 1V.A.2. Judges exercising the gate-keeping function inherent in
admissibility determinations must carefully consider both the expert's credentials and
the relevance of battered woman syndrome evidence.
264. Greene, supra note 28, at 5A.
265. Id. For suggestions regarding how to avoid a defendant-batterer's reliance on
the battered woman syndrome to bolster his defense, see infra part IV.
266. Greene, supra note 28, at 5A.
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ticular trial do not relate to the battered woman's mental state. This
part argues that in deciding whether to admit expert testimony on the
battered woman syndrome, courts must guard against allowing experts
on battered women to testify about particulars regarding men who
batter. This part also outlines an alternative theory of the psychologi-
cal impact of prolonged spousal abuse, and advocates increased reli-
ance on its conclusions. Finally, this part calls for further research on
a batterer's psychological proffle as a precursor to consideration of
when such a profile might be relevant to a criminal case.
A. Battered Woman Syndrome Does Not Provide a
Profile of Men Who Batter
As a threshold matter, when a defendant-batterer claims not to fit
the profile of a man who batters or of a batterer who would likely kill
his victim, courts should reject the introduction of expert testimony on
the battered woman syndrome on grounds of relevance. The battered
woman syndrome does not purport to describe characteristics of men
who batter,267 nor does it purport to describe every battering
relationship. 68
1. Battered Woman Syndrome Explains Psychological Symptoms
Often Observed in Victims of Domestic Violence
The battered woman syndrome relates only to the psychological
symptoms of victims of domestic violence. 69 It does not, however,
provide legally significant information about a defendant-batterer's
state of mind. Dr. Walker, in her leading work on battered women,
developed her theory after studies involving interviews with women-
not men.2 70 Arguably, getting information about batterers from their
victims is not the most effective method of scientific analysis. Any
attempt to utilize data about batterers from the information discerni-
ble from the battered woman syndrome misuses a theory developed to
understand why women stay in abusive relationships."'
267. See The Battered Woman, supra note 7, at 43 ("[A] psychological rationale
will be developed to explain why the battered woman becomes a victim in the first
place and how the process of victimization is perpetuated to the point of psychological
paralysis." (emphasis added)).
268. Walker, Syndrome and Self-Defense, supra note 8, at 330 ("[T]here was a defi-
nite pattern seen in two-thirds of the 1,600 battering incidents reported by the 400
women interviewed for the research study." (emphasis added)).
269. Lenore E. Walker, How Battering Happens and How To Stop It, in Battered
Women 59-64 (Donna Moore ed., 1979) (describing how she used information gath-
ered from interviews with battered women to develop the battered woman
syndrome).
270. See discussion supra note 138 (describing Dr. Walker's research which in-
cluded interviews with 400 women).
271. See Walker, supra note 269, at 63. Dr. Walker explicitly states, "From my re-
search I have developed a psychological rationale regarding why the battered woman
becomes a victim . . . 2" Id.
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In the context of a criminal case, courts must not allow expert wit-
nesses to testify as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant. Al-
lowing an expert to attempt to remove the defendant-batterer from
the profile of men likely to commit a homicide gives undue weight to
opinion testimony.217 It is within the province of the jury to weigh all
the objective evidence when determining whether a defendant has
been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.2" Opining that a par-
ticular defendant-batterer does not exhibit traits typical of a murderer
should not obfuscate the other facts presented-whether it is DNA
evidence, eyewitness testimony, or prior incidents of abuse.' "
. Even though the battered woman syndrome has proved helpful in
illuminating the lives of battered women in certain contexts, it must
not be relied on in an improper and expansive way. One unantici-
pated result of using the battered woman syndrome in the prosecution
of a defendant-batterer is that it can shift the focus away from the
defendant and his actions to the victim and her psyche. In addition to
challenging the relevancy of battered woman syndrome evidence in
the criminal prosecution of a defendant-batterer, another way to
avoid allowing battered woman syndrome evidence to become a tool
for batterers is to shift the focus of the psychological evidence at trial
away from the victim and her psychological state. Prosecutors must
not attempt to prove a defendant's guilt of the crime at issue by rely-
ing exclusively on expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome
to explain why the battered woman fell prey to the batterer and acted
in seemingly abnormal ways. While such evidence, coupled with evi-
dence of prior incidents of violence, may be relevant to show the de-
fendant's motive, intent, or a pattern of abuse,2 75 the victim's
psychological state is not the ultimate issue for the jury to decide.
272. As discussed, in a criminal trial an expert is prohibited from giving her opinion
regarding the requisite mental state of the defendant. See supra notes 35-36 and ac-
companying text.
273. It is not the role of an expert witness testifying on the battered woman syn-
drome to make a determination regarding the credibility of the battered woman.
Rather, the expert's role at trial is to provide for the jury a possible explanation for
the behavior of the battered woman defendant. See State v. Stringer, No. 94-155, 1995
Mont. LEXIS 121, at *19, (Mont. Jan. 26, 1995) ("It is also important to re-emphasize
that the expert may not testify to or comment upon the credibility of the witness.").
274. Arguably, such testimony would be unduly prejudicial-allowing the jury to
base its decision on improper grounds. Courts must strictly apply the standards of
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to avoid such a result. See supra note 209 (discussing
Federal Rule of Evidence 403).
275. Some states, such as California, statutorily allow the admission of evidence of
prior crimes or bad acts. For example, California Evidence Code section 1101(b)
states, in pertinent part:
Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person
committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some
fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, iden-
tity, or absence of mistake or accident... ) other than his or her disposition
to commit such an act.
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Furthermore, broad reliance on battered woman syndrome evi-
dence facilitates the defendant-batterer's ability to minimize his prior
abusive behavior. As Dr. Walker herself has indicated, "I believe that
all of the work I have done in trying to measure battered woman syn-
drome and trying to present it in legal cases cannot tell us alone
whether [a batterer] could have killed .... ,276 Dr. Walker is correct
in her assertion that expert testimony alone is insufficient to indicate
whether a batterer killed his spouse. It is only useful, perhaps, to help
jurors understand the psychological context of prior abuse. If courts
limit the admissibility of battered woman syndrome evidence and
guard against the improper application of the theory,2 77 Dr. Walker's
concerns that her syndrome may be used inappropriately to convict a
batterer will be allayed.278 Even in the absence of expert testimony
on the battered woman syndrome, however, the prosecutor may per-
missibly focus on the fact that the defendant battered the victim in the
past. The prosecutor can rely on evidence of prior crimes or prior bad
acts-as in any other criminal case-to show motive, intent, or
identity.279
2. Experts on Battered Women Are Not Qualified To Testify as
Experts on Men Who Batter
Potential experts can be subject to challenges to their qualifica-
tions.280 Experts on battered women lack the requisite expertise to be
qualified to testify on men who batter. As such, an expert should not
be allowed to testify about a particular batterer when her knowledge
is based on research regarding battered women. For example, Dr.
Walker herself has admitted to having done no research on men who
batter.281 Her only conclusions regarding men who batter stem from
Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(b) (West 1966 & Supp. 1995). The Federal Rules have a simi-
lar restriction on the permissible use of character evidence. The Rules state:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
276. Boxall, supra note 11, at A30 (quoting Lenore Walker).
277. See discussion supra part IV.A.
278. See supra text accompanying note 29.
279. See supra note 275 (discussing California's Evidence Code).
280. See supra note 35 (discussing the admissibility of expert testimony); see also
Humble v. State, 652 So. 2d 1213, 1213-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a
woman who had seventeen "years experience working in the field of domestic vio-
lence, operating shelters and domestic-violence programs, and ha[d] attended and
taught numerous workshops on spouse abuse.... [but had] no formal education in the
field of mental health" was therefore, "unqualified to explain the [battered woman]
syndrome to the jury").
281. Bass, supra note 29, at 8. "At a press conference ... Walker acknowledged
that she has done no research on men who batter. But she said that she ... [was]
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battered women's portrayals of batterers-certainly not the most ob-jective source of information.' Yet she held herself out as an expert
qualified to testify that certain batterers do not fit the profile of a man
who would likely kill his victim-either because he does not exhibit
"the kind of antisocial personal disorders that we sometimes see," 2 3
or because his behavior does not comport with her three-phase
model." Ironically, Dr. Walker has previously asserted in her writ-
ings that men who batter tend not to exhibit personality traits consis-
tent with a psychological disorder,' claiming "[batterers] tend not to
be stereotypical of a criminal or psychopath."'  Critics forcefully
challenge Dr. Walker's ability to make an assessment regarding men
who batter. 7
Courts should require any expert witness whose research has fo-
cused on battered women to explain how the purported expert can
assert that a defendant does not fit the profile of a batterer, despite
the fact that the literature generally concludes that a batterer is not
distinctly recognizable as such. Dr. Walker once asserted:
[Batterers] are not necessarily mentally ill people. They come from
all walks of life; they hold good positions in the community; they
serve on our courts, in our police agencies, in our mental health
institutions; they are our psychologists, as weU as our lawyers,
judges, and legislators. This makes it not only difficult to reconize
a batterer but often difficult to believe when you meet him.
familiar with the research literature on violent men and would be consulting other
specialists before the trial." Id
282. See supra text accompanying notes 249-50.
283. Greene, supra note 28, at IA. Dr. Walker explained that her testimony in the
Simpson trial will assert that "[t]he pattern of abuse in this case is not the typical kind
that results in a homicide. . . . There's no evidence of life-threatening behavior
throughout the relationship. And there's no evidence of the kind of antisocial per-
sonal disorders that we sometimes see." Id.
284. See supra text accompanying note 38 (describing Dr. Walker's determination
that in an abusive relationship escalating life-threatening behavior typically precedes
a homicide).
285. See infra text accompanying notes 311-12 (profiling some common characteris-
tics of men who batter).
286. Walker, supra note 269, at 62.
287. See, e.g., Bass, supra note 29, at 8 (noting criticism of Dr. Walker's role in the
Simpson trial by Richard J. Gelles, director of the family violence research program at
the University of Rhode Island); Jones, supra note 7, at 15A (describing how courts
have twisted the battered woman syndrome to benefit batterers' claims). Dr.
Walker's critics do not claim that no expert exists who is qualified to testify regarding
common characteristics of men who batter their spouses. Rather, they question her
experience with such research: "If she develops a psychological profile of OJ., to
what is she going to compare it? She, of all the domestic violence experts in the
country, is the least experienced in analyzing data from men who batter." Bass, supra
note 29, at 8 (quoting a critic of Dr. Walker's participation as an expert for OJ.
Simpson).
288. Id.
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Courts should not allow an expert on battered women to testify about
areas beyond the scope of her expertise. In the context of a trial of a
defendant-batterer, battered woman syndrome evidence is irrelevant
to the actions of the defendant.
B. Prosecutors Should Rely on Other Psychological Theories of the
Effects of Prolonged Abuse
The battered woman syndrome, a description of how an otherwise
normal person responds to chronic abuse or traumatic stress, is only
one of a number of theories that describes the responses of victims of
domestic violence.289 Assuming that courts do not reject completely a
defendant-batterer's use of the battered woman syndrome to support
his claim, prosecutors' reliance on alternative psychological theories
might provide a more balanced explanation of a battered woman's
behavior. If a defendant-batterer is able to label his victim's actions as
inconsistent with expected behavior under the battered woman syn-
drome, prosecutors should use expert testimony based on other viable
psychological interpretations of the conduct of battered women in or-
der to explain the conduct of the victim.
One such theory available to prosecutors is the "survivor theory. '290
The survivor theory directly challenges the conclusions of the battered
woman syndrome.29' This alternative characterization of battered wo-
289. See, e.g., Allard, supra note 127 (offering an alternative theory regarding the
effect of domestic violence on the victim); Dutton, supra note 127 (same).
290. Gondolf & Fisher, supra note 106, at 17-18.
291. Gondolf and Fisher include in their book a table outlining the distinctions be-
tween explaining battered women's behavior as symptoms suffered as a result of
learned helplessness or, in the alternative, as behavior explained under the survivor
hypothesis. They state:
Learned Helplessness
1. Severe abuse fosters a sense of helplessness in the victim. Abuse as a
child and the neglect of help sources intensifies this helplessness. The bat-
tered woman is consequently severely victimized.
2. The victim experiences low self-esteem, self-blame, guilt, and depression.
The only way to feel some sense of control over what is otherwise an unpre-
dictable environment is to think that "if I change my ways, things will get
better." But the abuse continues.
3. The victim eventually becomes psychologically paralyzed. She fails to
seek help for herself and may even appear passive before the beatings.
When she does contact a help source, she is very tentative about receiving
help and is likely to return to the batterer despite advice or opportunity to
leave.
4. This vulnerability and indecisiveness prolongs the violence and may con-
tribute to its intensification. Some observers argue that this tendency may
reflect an underlying masochism in the battered woman. The woman may
feel that she deserves to be beaten and accepts it as a fulfillment of her
expectations.
5. Battered women as victims need primarily psychological counseling to
treat their low self-esteem, depression, and masochism. Cognitive therapy
that addresses attributions of blame for the abuse may also be particularly
effective in motivating the victim.
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men describes them as "active survivors rather than helpless vic-
tims.... [B]attered women remain in abusive situations not because
they have been passive but because they have tried to escape with no
avail." 21 The survivor theory "contradicts the assumptions of learned
helplessness: Battered women increase their helpseeking in the face
of increased violence, rather than decrease helpseeking as learned
helplessness would suggest. 2 93 The fundamental assumption of the
theory is that women seek help in direct proportion to the realization
that they are in danger.29 The activities used in their effort to survive
are characterized as "heroically assertive and persistent."2 "s
By redefining the symptoms observed in battered women, the survi-
vor theory focuses on the reasons why most women survive abusive
relationships. 296 Empirical studies used to substantiate the hypothesis
Survivor Hypothesis
1. Severe abuse prompts innovative coping strategies from battered women
and efforts to seek help. Previous abuse and neglect by help sources lead
women to try other help sources and strategies to lessen the abuse. The
battered woman, in this light, is a "survivor."
2. The survivor may experience anxiety or uncertainty over the prospects of
leaving the batterer. The lack of options, know-how, and finances raise fears
about trying to escape the batterer. The battered woman may therefore at-
tempt to change the batterer instead of attempting to leave.
3. The survivor actively seeks help from a variety of informal and formal
help sources. There is most often inadequate or piecemeal helpgiving that
leaves the woman little alternative but to return to the batterer. The help-
seeking continues, however.
4. The failure of help sources to intervene in a comprehensive and decisive
fashion allows abuse to continue and escalate. The inadequacy of help
sources may be attributed to a kind of learned helplessness experienced in
many community services. Service providers feel too overwhelmed and lim-
ited in their resources to be effective and therefore do not try as hard as they
might.
5. Battered women as survivors of abuse need, most of all, access to re-
sources that would enable them to escape the batterer. Community services
need to be coordinated to assure the needed allocation of resources and in-
tegrated to assure long-term comprehensive intervention.
Id. at 12.
292. 1d. at 17.
293. Id. at 17-18. The authors contend that "helpseeking is likely to increase as
wife abuse, child abuse, and the batterer's antisocial behavior (substance abuse, gen-
eral violence, and arrests) increase." Id. at 18.
294. Id. The survivor tendency in women is explained by looking at a number of
scientific and sociological findings: anthropological arguments that "females have an
instinctual tendency to attempt to preserve life" rooted in physiological distinctions
that allow them to bear children; feminist assertions that women have a greater ap-
preciation for human life, in part, because their bodies are more linked with "nature";
and sociological explanations of women's tendency to cling to life as a result of sociali-
zation, which "ascribe[s] to women [roles] as domestic servants." I&a at 19-20.
295. Id. at 18.
296. Id. at 21-22. As Gondolf and Fisher explain:
This is not to deny the observations of shelter workers that some battered
women do experience severe low self-esteem, guilt, self-blame, depression,
vulnerability, and futility-all of which are identified with learned helpless-
ness. Some battered women may even appear to act carelessly and provoca-
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that battered women are fundamentally survivors include Dr.
Walker's own research.2" As asserted by scholars espousing the sur-
vivor theory, Dr. Walker discovered "that the women in [one] sample
were not necessarily beaten into submissiveness; rather, helpseeking
increased as the positive reinforcements within the relationship de-
creased and the costs of the relationship in terms of abusiveness and
injury increased."2 98 It is imperative for prosecutors and judges to re-
alize that the same data relied on by Dr. Walker in developing the
battered woman syndrome have provided support for an antithetical
rationale-the survivor theory.299
If a defendant attempts to portray a particular battered woman as
someone who did not act in accordance with the battered woman syn-
drome, prosecutors should be willing to offer evidence of other theo-
ries that better describe her actions. The defendant's effort to show
that his victim was not passive or helpless will be rendered futile if, for
example, a victim can assert that her behavior falls squarely within the
contours of the survivor theory. The survivor theory should not be
viewed as a replacement for the battered woman syndrome. Instead,
as with other legal strategies, an attorney should rely on all available
studies that potentially support his or her client's case. To date, how-
ever, the practical application of this theory in the courtroom is
untested.3 oo
tively at times, as the proponents of masochism argue. But cast in another
light, these "symptoms" take on a different meaning, as well as a different
proportion.
Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
297. Id- at 18. According to Gondolf and Fisher, "[p]erhaps the most significant of
these empirical works is Walker's The Battered Women's Syndrome (1984), designed
to verify the author's original learned helplessness and 'cycle of violence' theoriza-
tion." Id.
298. Id.
299. Gondolf and Fisher refer to Dr. Walker's work to support their theory that
women seek help in proportion to their perception of danger. They state that as Dr.
Walker's results illustrate:
As the violence escalated, so did the probability that the battered women
would seek help. While only 14 percent sought help after the first battering
incident, 22 percent did after the second, 31 percent after one of the worst,
and 49 percent sought help after the last incident. About one-quarter of the
women left temporarily immediately after each battering incident, although
these were not necessarily the same women each time.
Id. (citing generally to The Battered Woman Syndrome, supra note 8, at 26).
300. Before the survivor theory can achieve wide spread judicial acceptance, it will
have to meet the Supreme Court standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796-98 (1993). In Daubert, the Court outlined
various factors trial judges must look to when deciding whether certain scientific evi-
dence can be introduced at trial as scientific knowledge offered by an expert. The
factors include whether the theory has been tested; whether it has been subject to
peer review and publication; what its rate of error is; whether scientific protocols gov-
ern the test; and whether the theory has received general acceptance in the scientific
community. None of the factors is dispositive. See also Fed. R. Evid. 702 (governing
the admissibility of expert testimony and allowing "scientific, technical, or other spe-
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As discussed above, the battered woman syndrome is a helpful tool
when explaining why a battered woman felt compelled to use deadly
force to defend her life.3"' The theory is used most often in such a
context, and can help to dispel disparaging myths that juries may have
regarding battered women. 02 The battered woman syndrome empha-
sizes the helplessness of a battered woman, therefore complementing
the theory of self-defense and helping the jury understand why killing
her batterer was a reasonable option. But in certain contexts, the sur-
vivor theory may better support a battered woman's claims and may
provide a more consistent portrayal of the reality of the battered wo-
man's life. Such contexts include: when she clearly does not fit within
the parameters of the battered woman syndrome and does not exhibit
traits of learned helplessness; when she is trying to assert that she is a
capable parent deserving of custody of her children; and when her
batterer is on trial and attempting to scrutinize their relationship as
distinct from the "typical" battering cycle. In such cases, it would be
beneficial and more accurate for a battered woman to portray herself
as a woman determined and able to survive even in the face of brutal
treatment by her batterer.0 3
The survivor theory may be most illuminating for a prosecutor in
the context of the prosecution of a defendant-batterer for a homicide.
As discussed above, a defendant-batterer may try to argue that a par-
ticular battered woman does not fit the profile of a woman suffering
from the battered woman syndrome. He may argue that because she
was not passive or helpless, she must not suffer from the battered wo-
man syndrome, and therefore he did not abuse or murder her. If a
prosecutor, relying on the psychological explanation of the survivor
theory, instead places a battering relationship in the survivor context,
it becomes difficult for a defendant-batterer to use such a description
to his advantage. The survivor theory provides an alternative psycho-
cialized knowledge [if it] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue").
In conjunction with the Daubert test, trial judges must weigh the risk of confusing
the jury because of the appearance of an expert who arguably is given heightened
credit for what he or she testifies to. According to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403.
301. See supra part HI.A.
302. See supra part II.A.
303. A battered woman on trial for killing her husband and claiming self-defense
who does not want to portray herself as suffering from learned helplessness could also
rely on the survivor theory. Consistent with her plea, she could argue that her only
means of survival at the point she fought back against her abuser was to use deadly
force. According to the survivor theory, a battered woman is resourceful and adopts
survival techniques in response to her immediate needs. A battered woman could
logically rely on such theory to support her plea of self-defense. See supra text accom-
panying notes 290-99 (outlining the survivor theory).
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logical context for juries to examine facts, and thus makes it more
difficult for defendant-batterers to misuse the battered woman
syndrome.
Despite the existence of numerous theories analyzing why battered
women act in certain ways,3" the battered woman syndrome is the
most accepted theory in the legal arena. At least one commentator
believes that the legal community unduly rushed to rely on the theory,
which proved helpful to explain a battered woman's conduct, in an
effort to appear committed to the cause of protecting victims of do-
mestic violence.30 5 She points out that the theory is not a diagnostic
too130 6 but rather a psychological explanation of reactions to abuse-
coming from the underlying premise that abuse has occurred. 30 7
Others have properly noted that evidence of the battered woman syn-
drome is most relevant in a limited context: to aid jurors in assessing a
self-defense claim of a battered woman who has killed her batterer
after prolonged abuse. ° Regardless of how Dr. Walker's theory has
been used in the past, it is important for attorneys, judges, and others
in the legal system to regard the battered woman syndrome in the
proper context-one theory among many.
C. Further Research Must Be Conducted
Regarding Men Who Batter
While there are different theories explaining why battered women
act in certain distinct ways, little research has been done on men who
batter. Most researchers conclude that batterers do not come from
generalized social or economic groups. 309 As one researcher points
out, "Battering occurs in all social groupings. It crosses all racial, eth-
nic, socioeconomic, religious, age and geographic boundaries. '310
Any expert who purports to testify to the state of mind of a defend-
ant-batterer must have expertise on men who batter. Because of the
lack of research on men who batter, however, it remains unclear how
information about batterers could be used in a criminal case. Such
expert testimony clearly would have to be relevant to the overall case
and pertinent to the defendant-batterer's state of mind.
304. See sources listed supra note 127.
305. Jones, supra note 7, at 15A.
306. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
307. See Jones, supra note 7, at 15A.
308. See, e.g., Patton, supra note 111, at 10 (discussing the need for expert testi-
mony in domestic violence cases to assure that the trier of fact understands the psy-
chological symptoms of battered women).
309. Nancy Hutchings, The Violent Family: Victimization of Women, Children and
Elders 73 (1988).
310. Id.
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While there is not a universal personality profile of men who batter,
some researchers have identified certain recurring characteristics. 1
Some personality traits associated with batterers include: insecurity,
traditionally reflected in extreme jealousy, poor verbal communica-
tion skills, especially in relation to expressing emotions; domineering,
evidenced by demanding control over most aspects of his marriage;
dual personality, characterized by an ability to be charming to others
yet cruel to his wife; adherence to traditional sex-role models; lack of
assertiveness in other areas of life causing aggression to become "bot-
tled up;" dependency needs, illustrated by making extraordinary ef-
forts to get his wife to return if she leaves him; and contradictory
personality traits.312
Generally, such evidence would be inadmissible "profile" evi-
dence.313 As more research is conducted on the psyche and character-
istics of men who batter, however, litigators may find appropriate uses
of such data offered by the prosecution or the defense that would fit
within evidentiary restrictions. Furthermore, with additional research,
a core group of experts specializing in research on men who batter will
emerge. The introduction of such findings might, in an appropriate
evidentiary context, help keep the jury's attention focused on evi-
dence relevant to the crime at issue, thus preventing the batterer from
attempting to base his claim of innocence on evidence related to the
victim's psychological characteristics. The mere fact that the battered
woman syndrome theorizes about the psychological trauma of domes-
tic violence does not indicate that such evidence is relevant in all crim-
inal contexts.
CONCLUSION
Battered woman syndrome evidence can be helpful as a means to
educate juries about why battered women seem to act in illogical and
abnormal ways. The battered woman syndrome, however, does not
precisely describe every battering relationship,3 4 nor is it the only
psychological explanation of why battered women respond to abuse in
certain distinct ways.31 Broad reliance on expert testimony regarding
311. Hofeller, supra note 49, at 83 ("Because domestic violence is so widespread, it
is unlikely that there is one 'personality type' which is characteristic of all violent men.
Nevertheless, it is still possible to identify some common factors.").
312. ld. at 83-87; see also supra text accompanying notes 309-12 (discussing some
common traits of men who batter).
313. See, e.g., United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1422 (9th Cir. 1995) (denouncing
in a drug courier prosecution the use of "profile evidence as substantive evidence of a
defendant's innocence or guilt" (citations omitted)). Following such prohibition of
"profile evidence," a prosecutor in the trial of a defendant-batterer would not be per-
mitted to introduce evidence regarding the profile of men who batter as substantive
evidence of the defendant-batterer's innocence or guilt.
314. See supra note 138.
315. See discussion supra part IV.B.
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the battered woman syndrome outside its proper context is not helpful
to a jury. In fact, such evidence may be misleading. For example, a
batterer may attempt to distinguish his relationship with the victim
from the patterns of the battered woman syndrome to create doubt in
the jury regarding the extent or existence of the alleged abuse. The
fact that a battered woman's experience does not mirror the model of
the battered woman syndrome, however, does not indicate that she
was not abused.316
The most potentially damaging use of the battered woman syn-
drome is the improper reliance on the theory by a defendant-batterer
on trial for murdering his wife. A theory developed to explain the
psyche of a particular group of women does not translate into appro-
priate evidence relating to the actions of an accused batterer. By con-
sidering relevance and the proper use of expert testimony, courts can
ensure that battered woman syndrome evidence is used accurately and
in a way that is faithful to its theoretical and psychological basis.
316. See discussion supra part III.C.
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